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Attempts to determine the value and intergenerational importance of environmental goods have a 
difficult time accounting for the non-basic services that ecosystems provide. Discussions of ‘Critical 
Natural Capital’ deem some ecological goods ‘non-substitutable’: acting justly towards the future 
requires their preservation. These characterizations, however, often miss a crucial distinction 
between the type of non-substitutability exhibited by basic CNC and sociocultural CNC: the former 
is only technologically and practically non-substitutable while the latter is constructed as such by 
specific groups regarding token natural spaces. In this thesis, I address whether sociocultural natural 
capital is a required component in the basket of goods we leave for future generations. While the 
constructed nature of the value of these goods makes their implication in a theory of 
intergenerational justice subject to a number of objections, I argue—employing the Rawlsian tools 
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THE OBJECTS OF INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 
 
When we talk about our obligations to the future, we often refer to specific things—parks, places, 
woods, and wetlands. When President Obama says “Yosemite, 50 years from now, could be 
dramatically different, and I don’t think anybody wants that,” (Welsh 2016) he speaks, with 
normative force, as if certain identifiable places ought to persist.  Even Robert Solow, a well-known 
adversary of stringent environmental policy, can’t resist this notion: “It makes perfectly good sense,” 
he says, “to insist that certain unique and irreplaceable assets should be preserved for their own 
sake; nearly everyone would feel that way about Yosemite...”(my emphasis) (Solow 1993, 168). The 
intuition is clear: we owe future people a world populated with some very specific ecological objects 
which are not up for substitution. What, though, is the nature of this obligation? Specifically: Is the 
duty to preserve certain value-laden heritage for future generations merely supererogatory, or is it 
instead a requirement of justice that the future world is furnished with these environmental goods?  
These questions are inspired by recent New Zealand legislation that has brought legal force 
to the claim that certain places ought to exist.  In 2017, the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement) Act codified an obligation to maintain a particularly significant ecosystem by affording 
the Whanganui River ‘legal identity,’ including all the “rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a 
legal person” (Whanganui River Deed of Settlement 2014, 2.14.1). While a discussion of the 
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legislation itself is not the focus of this project,1 I take the 2017 Te Awa Tupua Act to be an 
illustrative instance of the guiding intuition I consider in this thesis—that is, that there are some 
distinct natural spaces which are a feature of what we owe the future. The Te Awa Tupua Act affirms 
this intuition in policy: like a person, the Whanganui River is the kind of thing that we are obliged 
to ensure can persist through time.  
Throughout the four chapters of this thesis I feature the Whanganui River as a central 
example in order to motivate and bring realism to my discussion of intergenerational ecological 
obligations.  In doing so, I ground my arguments in contemporary environmental concerns, steering 
well clear of the romantic conservationist's plea to conserve some wild and external nature into 
perpetuity. In the following extended introduction, then, I will bring context and background to the 
later claims of my thesis by underscoring the way in which token value-laden natural places can 
come to be non-substitutable components of the lives of specific individuals. That particular spaces 
like the Whanganui River are necessary features in current characterizations of the good life is a 
premise I rely upon in Chapter IV, and the best defense of this assumption is a thoroughgoing 
description of the way in which an actual river is deeply integrated into the lives of those living near 
it.  
 
                                                 
1In other work ‘Philosophical Perspectives on Legal Personality and Intergenerational Justice’ (forthcoming), I offer 
specific commentary on this legislation. For a general introduction see Morris (2010) and Ruru (2009).  
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The History of the Whanganui River, a Non-Substitutable Place  
New Zealand’s history is one of seismic shifts, both geologically and culturally. The first 
settlers of Aotearoa arrived no later than 1300 AD, reaching the shores in double-hulled canoes from 
neighboring pacific islands. The new inhabitants developed a unique Māori culture, forming iwis 
(tribes), and establishing a distinct worldview which is primarily revealed in a complex cosmology 
passed down through the tradition of storytelling. As Māori Marsden (1992) explains, much of this 
corpus of knowledge references the close relationship between humans and the natural world or 
whenua. In fact, whenua means both ‘earth’ and ‘placenta,’ illustrating that “just as the foetus is 
nurtured in the mother’s womb and after the baby’s birth upon her breast, so all life forms are 
nurtured in the womb and upon the earth’s breast” (Marsden and Henare 1992, 17). A traditional 
Māori worldview thus understands human beings as integral to and inseparable from the 
environments they inhabit.   
For instance, Māori cosmology sees the earth (Papatuanuku) as personified and living, with 
natural systems analogous to human biology: “the streams of water are her arteries bringing the life 
giving waters for her to imbibe and share with her offspring. Those same streams act as alimentary 
canals and help in the disposal of waste” (Marsden and Henare, 68).  Humans in this framework 
represent the conscious mind, playing an integral role in the flourishing of earth as a whole. In the 
same way as human health cannot be reduced to the functioning of a particular organism, the health 
of Papatuanuku is understood holistically.  
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Further demonstrative of the inalienable connection between Māori and their local 
environment is the concept of whakapapa, a genealogical view in which “man’s early ancestry traces 
back through its myth heroes to the gods through mother earth” (11). Earth is seen as a common 
ancestor of all humans; an individual did  “not evolve from the primates but was born out of the seed 
of the god Tane, impregnated into the dawn maid Hineahuone who was formed and shaped out of 
the red clay – Onekura – of mother earth” (12). This kind of ancestral kinship is revealed in the 
practice of mihimihi, in which people introduce themselves with reference to their genealogy, 
including, as primal factors in their identities, the rivers and mountains from whom they descend.  
As European settlers began to populate New Zealand in the early 1800’s, they brought with 
them contrasting concepts and norms concerning human-environment relations. The prospects of a 
new land with seemingly endless resources fostered an ideology of exploitation: many colonists did 
not intend to stay in New Zealand for long and thus could adopt a ‘frontier ethic’ in which they 
labored to exploit natural resources for a profit with little concern regarding long-term effects. The 
underlying doctrine of the colonists was rooted in the domination of external nature—following 
Locke, the principle of terra nullius asserted that nature was not ‘owned’ until one subdued the land 
through human labor. Land that was not owned and mixed with human labor was considered 
‘waste.’2 
                                                 
2See Rolston (2016) for an introduction to contrasting indigenous-settler environmental ethics.  
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In 1840, the British Crown and Māori rangatira (chiefs) signed the Treaty of Waitangi, New 
Zealand’s founding document. The Treaty was designed for the mutual benefit of both the Crown 
and Māori, an (ostensibly) well intentioned effort to ensure fair interactions, specifically land 
transactions, between the Māori and the British. The application of the Treaty, however, was subject 
to the usual chaos of colonialism, and the resulting treatment of Māori and Māori land diverged 
sharply from any aspirations of equity espoused by the Treaty: by 1939 only 3.5 million acres of 
land (around 6% of NZ) remained under Māori  ownership, Māori  economic and social development 
was stymied, and many tapu (sacred places) including urupā (burial grounds) were destroyed 
entirely (McAloon 2009).  
The Whanganui River is a poignant example in which principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
were conclusively breached, specifically the right to chieftainship over natural resources. At the time 
of the Treaty signing, the Whanganui Iwi possessed what can only be understood as ownership, 
despite their lack of use of an analogous term (Whanganui River Report 1999, 106). In the mid 
1800’s the Crown began exercising authority over the river by modifying river rapids to 
accommodate steamers and extracting gravel from the river, processes that were extremely 
damaging to the mana (honor, spirit) of the river. Eel and lamprey fishing sites, sources of 
sustenance as well as spaces of spiritual, cultural, and recreational value were particularly damaged 
by colonists (Young 1998).  The Whanganui Iwi, who were still exercising customary guardianship 
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of the river, were not consulted, despite ongoing attempts to voice their concerns (Tribunal 1999, 
284).   
In 1927, the Whanganui Iwi petitioned that their rights to sovereignty over the river be 
recognized. Following a 1958 ruling in which the Crown authorized, without Iwi consultation or 
consent, a water diversion program to fuel the Tongariro Power Scheme, in 1962 a final appeals 
court ruled that any customary right to the river had been extinguished by prior legislation. In 1988, 
the Whanganui River Māori Trust Board was created, with the goal of negotiating Whanganui Iwi 
claims regarding the river. Two years later the Trust Board presented the Waitangi Tribunal—the 
agency responsible for recommending reparations for treaty breaches—with the Whanganui River 
Claim, seeking redress for over a century of Crown injustice.  
The Whanganui River Report (1999), prepared by the Waitangi Tribunal in response to the 
River Claim, presents unequivocal evidence that the health of the Whanganui River is a necessary 
component of a decent life for the Whanganui Iwi. Matiu Mareikura emphasizes the importance of 
this resource for his people:  
 Our people go to the river to cleanse themselves, they go to the river to pray, and they go to 
the river to wash. Everything leads back to the river. And the river, in return, suffices all our 
needs. Without the river we really would be nothing because of all the resources that it gives 
back to us, the history that has gone on in the past with our people who have lived on the 
banks and used it as a motorway, used it as the only thoroughfare. We have been taught to 
treasure the river for what it is, and what it has been given to us for (57). 
 
Tariana Turia, a Whanganui Iwi member, also poignantly speaks to the harm of dissociation with 
her ancestral home. Her grandmother, she says, spoke to her:       
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About her relationship with the River as if it was an integral part of her life. Her life was 
about the river as their sustenance. It provided for them physically, spiritually, and culturally. 
It was also their place of recreation. I never understood this as a teenager, because my 
experience of the river down here at Putiki was that we were not allowed to swim or to eat 
kai from the river as it was polluted (57). 
 
Clearly, members of the Whanganui Iwi share the intuition outlined at the beginning of this thesis: 
the hypothesis that part of our intergenerational obligation involves the maintenance of specific 
places. Te Kuia Peeti echoes this generational commitment:  
To my sorrow my own children and mokopuna have not grown up in this environment, but 
what we had as children is no longer there. What we thought was unchangeable and 
immutable, the river, [has] undergone changes which we never dreamt of. Our beautiful safe 
swimming places have all gone. Because so much of the water was taken away, and therefore 
made it inhospitable for the fishlife to live, it was not uncommon for us to see dead [fish] 
floating down the river. Where once stood strong trees all along the river, we now have very 
serious erosion on our banks (80). 
     
The river is indisputably a non-substitutable feature in the lives of the Whanganui Iwi. Niko 
Tangaroa, a Māori elder, paradigmatically emphasizes this indivisibility: “The river and the land 
and its people are inseparable. And so if one is affected the other is affected also. The river is the 
heartbeat, the pulse of our people. . . . [If the river] dies, we die as a people. Ka mate te Awa, ka 
mate tatou te Iwi” (74). Tangaroa’s statement of interconnection secures that the Whanganui river 
is not perceived as some alienated other, uncoupled from the wellbeing of the communities engaging 
with it; rather, the functioning of the river is a necessary component of a decent life.  
 In giving all the legal protections of a person to this river, the 2017 Te Awa Tupua Act 
emphasizes an intergenerational obligation to ensure that future people occupy a world containing 
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distinct token places. The Whanganui has been vested with personality, deemed, to be the kind of 
thing—like a person—that ought to be protected such that it can persist through time. The above 
discussion highlights the way in which decades of Whanganui Iwi have fought for control over a 
distinct place, demonstrating the intergenerational importance and non-substitutability of that 
specific resource to a particular group. The Whanganui Iwi could have foregone this struggle and 
found other sources of spiritual and cultural sustenance, but instead they remained firmly committed 
to the health of this distinct ecosystem, the persistence of this particular place.  
 
The Whanganui River and this Thesis  
As noted, my project does not reckon with the intricacies of the Treaty of Waitangi system 
or the legal particularities of Te Awa Tupua. These are important conversations: there is much to be 
said regarding reparations for historical injustice and indigenous sovereignty over resources. 
Instead, I am concerned with the Whanganui River insofar as it exemplifies a place that might be a 
required feature of what we owe the future—a non-substitutable object of intergenerational justice. 
The crucial insight from my introduction, to reiterate, is that  part of the question of how we should 
act with regard to futurity involves an inquiry into what, exactly, ought to exist—what the physical 
world our children will inhabit will look like. Our concerns for posterity are not exhausted by simply 
hoping that futurity is happy; rather, we speak and act—as Te Awa Tupua highlights—as if there 
are specific unique spaces which ought to survive for the benefit of future people. This intuition 
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motivates my project, for the value and import of spaces such as the Whanganui River have been 
copiously understated—if not ignored entirely—in contemporary characterizations of 
intergenerational justice.  
My introduction also serves as a narrative-style defense of a few claims central to my 
forthcoming argument. First, it is illustrative of the importance of token natural spaces to currently 
living communities: the physical existence of the Whanganui River is necessary for the wellbeing 
of the Whanganui Iwi. Notably, no other replacement waterway could fulfil its cultural and spiritual 
function. Second, my foray into history highlights how part of the value of these natural spaces is 
derived from their continuous, cross generational role in the lives of proximal humans.  
It should be noted, though, that although the Whanganui River is both a motivation and a 
central example in this study, the scope of my discussion is intended as broader than a defense of 
the importance of preserving the sacred homeland of characteristically—or perhaps 
stereotypically—place-based indigenous peoples. The relationship between the Whanganui Iwi and 
their river is a paradigm case of non-substitutability, but simple reflection reveals that many if not 
most of us can identify places that we consider to be necessary components in our conceptions of 
the good. I would reference, for instance, ‘Hogback Mountain,’ in Goshen, Vermont. If you disagree 
that non-substitutable places of this kind exist for anyone but indigenous or place-based peoples, my 
arguments are still of intense import, for in characterizing intergenerational justice we ought to 
consider the claims of these groups. If you disagree further and contend that the Whanganui River 
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is not a necessary and valued element of the ‘good life’ for currently living members of the 
Whanganui Iwi, we have reached an inexorable impasse.3  
I’ll grant, though, that it is reasonable to be skeptical that we are required, as a matter of  
intergenerational justice, to preserve4 the Whanganui River, that these kinds of valuable natural 
features are a necessary component of a just bequest. One could reasonably claim that the health of 
these kinds of ecological goods is merely a project for indigenous activists and environmentalists, 
defenders of nature who are tasked with convincing a potentially disinterested public that the 
Whanganui River is valuable. On this view, preserving places that might not be strictly necessary 
for human sustenance is separate from the conversation of what we owe the future from the 
perspective of justice.  
In response to these general inquiries, this thesis will proceed in four chapters. We cannot 
answer these questions without first clarifying what we mean when we say—as Solow and other 
economists and ethicists do—that a resource is substitutable. After an introduction to 
intergenerational justice, in Chapter I, I unpack this non-substitutability, noting that current 
treatments of the concept overlook a crucial distinction between ecological goods that are ‘non-
                                                 
3If you dispute this point, I encourage a reading of the 1999 Whanganui River Report, especially the section 
‘Perspectives,’ as well as a viewing of the 1951 Documentary ‘The Legend of the Whanganui River.’ 
4In using the term ‘preserve’ throughout this paper, I do not mean to evoke the long history of the US environmental 
preservation vs conservation debate or the notion of ‘fortress preservation’ in which sections of land are cordoned 
off from human interaction. I use ‘preserve’ colloquially: to preserve the Whanganui River is to ensure that its 
valuable functions persist.  
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substitutable’5 as a means to fulfill essential human needs (‘basic critical natural capital’ or BCNC) 
and the sociocultural natural capital (SCNC) that has been constructed as an irreplaceable 
component of a community or individual’s flourishing. The literature on sustainability and 
intergenerational justice tends to conflate these two forms of non-substitutability.  If part of the 
project of intergenerational justice is determining the content of the basket of goods we leave the 
future and designating some objects as non-substitutable, then we ought to consider the distinct 
mechanisms that afford ecological goods such a status. I’ll claim that there is a stronger kind of non-
substitutability present in SCNC as compared to BCNC: the non-substitutability of SCNC is not 
merely the result of our lack of appropriate technological replacements.  
 Once we understand the features of non-substitutability, I proceed to Chapter II, where I 
outline the position of the ‘SCNC Skeptic,’ who might be, first, doubtful regarding the possibility 
of intergenerational justice generally, and, second, unconvinced that the kind of non-substitutability 
exhibited by the likes of the Whanganui River can situate such places within the domain of 
intergenerational justice. I respond, in this chapter, to the first set of worries, noting that problems 
such as non-identity and non-reciprocity are not fatal to the project of justice between non-
contemporaries. Once I’ve rescued the possibility of intergenerational justice, I turn to a second set 
of worries: the Skeptic has a number of arguments at her disposal suggesting that the preservation 
                                                 
5For consistency, I generally defer to the term ‘non-substitutable’ throughout this thesis, however, ‘non-fungible,’ 
and ‘irreplaceable’ can be considered synonymous.    
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of SCNC, while valuable, should not be an axiological objective of intergenerational justice. I 
explain these concerns in full: In short, the Skeptic will complain that requiring the persistence of 
SCNC is, given our uncertainty regarding future conditions and future people’s ability to adapt, a 
paternalistic and over demanding obligation. I respond to some aspects of the Skeptic’s claims, but 
save my full response to her more stubborn worries for Chapter IV.  
By the end of Chapter II, I have not yet offered a cohesive defense of the place of SCNC in 
intergenerational justice. In Chapter III, I search for available justifications in existing proposals: do 
contemporary accounts of justice between generations defend the place of SCNC? Do they offer 
hints in my search for reasons as to why these natural spaces are an important feature of a fair 
bestowal? Three of the most common currencies of intergenerational justice—preferentialism, 
resourcism, and capabilitarianism—do not explicitly demand that places like the Whanganui River 
ought to exist in the future. My intuition that we will have acted unjustly towards future people if 
they go without these things is not confirmed by existing theories. Perhaps, then, the intuition is 
false. Or, as I go on to note in this chapter, perhaps contemporary characterizations of 
intergenerational justice—which generally extend accounts of intragenerational justice to cover 
intergenerational concerns—do not fully consider distinct and emergent features of our relationship 
with future people, and in turn underspecify our obligations.  
In Chapter IV, I argue for the latter. A complete theory of intergenerational justice will 
include the preservation of such SCNC; value-laden natural heritage is a non-substitutable 
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component of the basket of goods we leave the future. To make this case, I first restrict myself to a 
particular style of argument: there are many ways to contend that we ought to preserve nature, but, 
in an effort to reply to the Skeptic’s complaints of paternalism, I will eschew those that rely on a 
particular conception of the good. To aid my discussion, I turn to the work of John Rawls, whose 
mechanisms for neutrally examining justice relations—the veil of ignorance (VOI) and the original 
position (OP)—provide the foundation from which I reply to my opponent. If crucial emergent 
aspects of our relationship with posterity—most particularly our ability to permanently influence 
the natural environment they inherit—are the kinds of things we know behind the VOI, the 
hypothetical contractors in the OP would, I argue, include valuable natural spaces as non-
substitutable features of a just bequest. I put forth three related reasons why self-interested parties 
would include SCNC within the bounds of intergenerational justice: first, SCNC is necessary for the 
preservation of a robust set of options for future people. Second, it is required for the meaning of 
many future-oriented projects, distinct options for the good life which require the long term 
persistence of particular token spaces. Third, attention to SCNC is, despite claims of 
‘intergenerational paternalism,’ is in line with a commitment to intergenerational neutrality 
regarding conceptions of the good. If my argument is successful, we will be left with good reasons 




INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND NON-SUBSTITUTABILITY 
 
While most scholarship on justice concerns relations between contemporaries (intragenerational 
justice), intergenerational justice examines fairness between individuals that live during different 
times, perhaps never overlapping during their time on earth.  While mapping the concept of justice 
in either case is a complex exercise, we can imagine instances which present as unequivocally unjust. 
Just as justice dictates that it is unfair to distribute resources unequally on the basis of race or gender, 
we might similarly think that the year one is born should have no bearing on the conditions they 
encounter. Injustice obtains, in this instance, if those born in 2500 experience, though no fault of 
their own, significantly worse circumstances than myself, born in 1993, especially if the latter 
person’s misery can be attributed to a particular action or inaction on my part.  Intergenerational 
justice then, like it’s contemporary counterpart, is centrally concerned with impartially arbitrating 
between the competing claims of individuals that will live at different times, providing to each that 
which she is due.  
As current human influence multiplies, clarifying this general maxim has become an exigent 
priority, and theories have come to be defined by their answers to three questions, that of the 
‘pattern,’ ‘scope,’ and ‘metric’ of our intergenerational obligations.6 In the interests of a general 
                                                 
6I follow Page (2007), Vrousalis (2016), and Dobson (1998, 64) in distinguishing and discussing intergenerational 
justice in terms of these three questions.  
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introduction to intergenerational justice, I will discuss each below, offering tentative responses. The 
third question, that of ‘metric,’ is the focus of this thesis. Before discussing these three questions, 
however, I will offer a few clarifying points regarding intergenerational justice that will be helpful 
moving forward.  
 
1.1 Clarifying Intergenerational Justice  
1.1.1 What is a Generation?  
First, one might inquire as to who or what are we obligated to?7 Justice between 
contemporaries seems to require an agent who can produce certain circumstances; we don’t for 
instance, consider it unjust if an individual happens to be killed by a falling tree or is born with a 
visible deformity (Miller 2017, 1.4).  Importantly, though, the relevant agent need not be an 
individual8, and in this thesis I will speak in terms of fairness between ‘generations,’ as generations, 
like other groups or institutions, are the kinds of things that can produce the circumstances inherited 
by succeeding cohorts of humans.   
                                                 
7I concern myself here only with anthropocentric obligations, and do not consider intergenerational obligations that 
we might have towards animals or directly to the natural world or specific instances of SCNC. 
8In ascribing to ‘generations’ the agency to bring about certain circumstances, and speaking of them as standing in 
relations of justice, I gesture at an endorsement of the possibility of collective responsibility and agency.  The 
methodological individualist, who thinks that generations are not the types of things that can have such agency, 
might prefer to conceive of each generations as comprising individuals with agency who stand in relations of justice, 
but for the purposes of this thesis I allow that the concept of ‘justice between generations,’ is understandable 
without taking a particularly strong stance on whether responsibility, blameworthiness, or agency can be attributed 
to groups.  
16 
 
I must, then, settle on a definition of ‘generation.’ In colloquial speech, we use the term 
generation loosely. I refer, for instance, to myself as of the generation of ‘millennials' born 
somewhere between the early 1980’s and 2004 (Bump 2014). As part of this cohort I, of course, am 
lazy and unmotivated in comparison to generations past—the baby boomers, generation X, or 
generation Y. This definition of generation is socially defined: as a millennial, I supposedly share at 
least some experiences, worldviews, and ideological leanings with my indolent peers. Under this 
characterization, different generations are alive at the same time. A similar ‘chronological’ 
definition of generation is strictly age-based, but also agrees that different generations exist at once 
by referring to demarcated age groups: people in their 20’s or octogenarians, for example.  
In contrast, we also speak of generations as groups of people that will live at different times. 
When President Obama writes that a lack of climate action threatens to “betray future generations,” 
(Twitter, June 2013), his use of the word generations implies not the different generation that Malia 
lives in, but a set of people who are not alive now. It this kind of generation which I am concerned 
with in this thesis. I follow Jorg Tremmel (2009): when I speak of future generations, I am generally 
interested in all those that are not alive at the time of consideration. In this sense, people may migrate 
from the status of ‘future generations’ to contemporaries: i.e., that set of people that is not alive now 
but will be born before my death. But ‘future generations’ may also refer to people who will be born 
after I die. It is not crucial to this project that I make a distinction, although generally I do have in 




1.1.2 A Word on Rights, Obligations, and Justice  
The potential for ‘environmental rights’—of either the legal or moral kind—has been a 
debate of recent intensity,9 but it is important to note that thesis is not primarily concerned with 
arguing that future people have rights to a certain quality of SCNC. This primarily due to a lack of 
consensus regarding whether currently existing people hold such rights: the scope of rights is a 
deeply disputed, but the right to live in a world with particular valuable aspects of nature is not 
widely endorsed (Miller 1999, 153); defenses of environmental rights are generally concerned with 
providing for the most basic of human needs. As highlighted in Section 1.4.1, the preservation of 
SCNC is distinct from the appeal to preserve the required conditions for human life, the latter being 
the kind of universal need generally associated with rights. In other words, access to a particular 
river is certainly a secondary concern if one doesn’t have water of any form to drink, and the rights 
of existing people to SCNC has not been systematically defended or secured in political systems: 
Consider, for example, the 2017 Dakota Keystone XL pipeline debate:10 if we are not in agreement 
that currently living people have rights to lands which have been guaranteed to them in legally 
enforceable treaties, it may well be futile to argue now that unidentifiable future people have such a 
right.   
                                                 
9See Hiskes (2005) for a comprehensive overview of environmental rights and Gellers (2017) for a recent discussion. 
10See Gasser (2012) for introduction.  
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Thus, despite the authority and political expediency of the language of rights, in this project 
I will not explicitly argue rights to SCNC exist. Instead, I situate myself in the language of justice 
and obligations: I will claim that irreversible destruction of valued natural features constitutes an 
intergenerational injustice, and that this potential injustice triggers obligations. This commits me to 
a number of positions regarding the form of these divisive concepts that are important to note.  
First, the relationship between justice and rights. In order to focus on SCNC and its place 
within a theory of justice, I do not deeply engage with the immense literature seeking to characterize 
and define this connection. Instead, I adopt the broadly Rawlsian framework of ‘justice as fairness,’ 
in which “each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all” (Rawls 2001, 42) 
and “in all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement 
for those similarly motivated and endowed” (44). I will say more in Chapter IV about Rawls and 
justice but for now it will suffice to note that one can deem a state of affairs unjust or unfair without 
reference to a specific right being violated: it is unfair that between two similarly motivated people, 
one might end up with a higher salary, but it is not quite natural to say that a right has been violated 
in this case. Specifically for my purposes, I can, then, claim that intergenerational injustice obtains 
without needing to identify and characterize a specific right that has been neglected—although 
further study may well identify and defend such a right.  
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Next, the relationship between justice and obligations. My primary objective in this thesis is 
to investigate the place of SCNC within a theory of intergenerational justice. I do not explicitly 
discuss the nature and scope of our obligation to prevent and mitigate such injustices, but I do assume 
that an injustice triggers some mitigatory obligation, somewhere, on the part of some individual or 
state agency. Of course, the relationship does not always work in reverse: duties can exist without 
an injustice to correspond to (consider, for instance, a duty to feed your dog). If injustice did not 
engender duty, my argument would be of little import, but it is a project for a further study to 
determine who ought to fulfil the duties generated by intergenerational injustices.  
Having briefly clarified some of the complex themes lying at the foundation of this thesis, I 
turn now to a specific explanation some of the central questions that any theory of intergenerational 
justice must contend with, before honing in on features of the final question, that of ‘metric.’  
 
1.2 Three Questions of Intergenerational Justice 
1.2.1 The Pattern of Intergenerational Justice 
First, one can inquire as to the ‘pattern’ of our intergenerational obligations. In other words, 
how seriously should we take the concerns of future, nonexistent individuals—how should burden 
and benefits be distributed across time? On one end of the spectrum, one might answer that we ought 
not be concerned with them at all—that is, that we have absolutely no moral obligations with respect 
to them. I have not encountered a philosopher who cogently defends this view, although it is perhaps 
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endorsed by certain American politicians.11 On the other end of the spectrum, we might count the 
interests of future people to be vastly more important than ours. Again, I have not come across 
supporters of this position, although there is certainly a case to be made that, given mushrooming 
population, we have a duty to save more than we inherited for the future.12  A more realistic 
proposition is that our duties towards the future are fulfilled if we act in accordance with our natural 
altruistic tendencies towards our children and grandchildren, and that they, in turn, exhibit the same 
care for their offspring.13 This is not a popular perspective: while these special obligations are 
significant, it is untenable to propose that they exhaust our duties towards future people. Future 
people may not even have identifiable progenitors from which to receive care, and furthermore this 
model cannot account for obligations we might have towards people in the further future. Gosseries 
and Meyer (2008) for instance argue that grounding intergenerational justice in principles of 
beneficence would find nothing wrong with a nuclear waste storage policy that was guaranteed to 
severely harm people living in a hundred years.  
                                                 
11Donald Trump has tweeted “I try to learn from the past, but I plan for the future by focusing exclusively on the 
present. That's where the fun is” (22 July, 2014). 
12I do not discuss population in this paper. Needless to say, this is a considerable area for further study: my 
suggestion that we save certain sociocultural natural capital might need reexamination if the future population is so 
high that only the most basic of needs can feasibly be met. 
13This view is normally traced to Passmore (1974), whose ‘chain of love’ argument suggest that since we love our 




More commonly, philosophers and policy makers have endorsed a sufficientarian answer to 
the pattern question.14 We have, in this view, passed the litmus test of intergenerational justice if 
future people reach some identifiable threshold. Regardless of how past generations fared, if 
subsequent people achieve a certain level of whatever we deem normatively important we have 
satisfied the demands of intergenerational justice. Once this threshold is determined, benefiting 
those below the threshold holds priority; those above are of no concern regardless of above-threshold 
inequality (Meyer 2016). An intergenerational sufficientarian will, of course, be tasked with defining 
the ‘threshold’ below which no one must fall: the 1987 Brundtland Report, in one example, posits a 
needs-based threshold by famously stating that, “sustainable development is development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”  The exact content of the threshold—be it needs, preference satisfaction, or resources—is a 
matter for my upcoming discussion of the ‘metric of our intergenerational obligation.  
Other prevalent answers to the pattern question are broadly utilitarian or libertarian,15 
however for the purposes of this project I situate myself as broadly egalitarian with respect to the 
interests of future people, a position which accords with many contemporary accounts of 
intergenerational justice.16 Roughly, intergenerational egalitarianism claims that all humans, 
                                                 
14 Meyer (2016) for example, adopts a sufficientarian view, mostly in order to circumvent the non-identity problem. 
See Page (2007) for additional exploration of intergenerational sufficientarianism.   
15See Steiner and Vallentyne (2009) for libertarian theories of intergenerational justice and Gosseries (2008) for a 
succinct discussion of different answers to the pattern question, including utilitarian responses.  
16See Ott (2003). Goodin (1982),  Page (2007) and Parfit (1986).   
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regardless of the year they were born, deserve equal treatment. This equality, can of course, be 
cashed out in various ways. One example, Rawlsian egalitarianism, which I will return to in Chapter 
IV, demands, via his famous original position contractual situation, that the year one was born play 
no causal role in their distribution of burdens and benefits. A Dworkinian luck egalitarian might 
relatedly posit that any ‘brute bad luck’—uncontrollable conditions such as the year of one’s birth—
ought not affect whether they are better or worse off (Dworkin 2002). Since my central concern is 
the question of intergenerational ‘metric,’ it is not particularly important at this point, however, that 
I endorse a particularly specific version of egalitarianism,17 the general position that when one is 
born should not influence their moral standing should suffice.  
 
1.2.2 The Scope of Intergenerational Justice  
The next question for the purveyor of intergenerational justice is that of scope: how far ahead 
should we concern ourselves? Assuming an egalitarian position, are we to take the interests of people 
in 100,000 years to be just as important as those currently living in poverty?  A basic distinction 
relevant to this query is between ‘generationalism’ and ‘chronopolitanism’ (Vrousalis 2016, 13). A 
generationalist contends that, at some point, our obligations to future generations are muted by their 
                                                 
17In fact it seems as if the preservation of SCNC that I hope to argue for is also compatible with a sufficientarian 
approach to intergenerational justice, so long as the threshold is specified as high enough as to include such places.  
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remoteness in time, excluding some from the purview of justice in virtue of the year they are born. 
A chronopolitan, in contrast, does not maintain that the scope of justice expires at any specified date.  
One common generational position, often endorsed by economists, submits that we should 
discount the interests of future people; the farther you live in the future, the less your interests matter. 
Economic reports such as Nordhaus’ famous studies on climate change generally discount future 
people at around three percent per year, noting that they will likely be wealthier than we are, and 
thus if we treat their (economic) interests equally we will end up saving too much for them 
(Nordhaus 1997). The ethical analogy to the economist’s calculations is generationalism: as we 
devise theories of intergenerational justice, the moral importance a particular individual declines the 
farther we move from the present day.  
Discounting/generationalism, despite being pervasive economic practices, are generally 
dismissed by philosophers, who commonly note an example from Parfit:       
Remoteness in time has, in itself, no more significance than remoteness in space. Suppose 
that I shoot some arrow into a distant wood, where it wounds some person. If I should have 
known that there might be someone in this wood, I am guilty of gross negligence. Because 
this person is far away, I cannot identify the person whom I harm. But this is no excuse. Nor 
is it any excuse that this person is far away. We should make the same claims about effects 
on people who are temporally remote (Parfit 1986, 357). 
 
There are few compelling reasons then, to support the claim that the scope of justice has an 
identifiable limit, and thus I follow Parfit and Vrousralis (2016) in adopting, moving forward, a 
chronopolitan response. As will become clear, my position regarding the ‘scope’ of our obligations 
is that we should concern ourselves with those in the future only insofar as we can know about and 
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influence the conditions of equality. We know very little about the world in 100,000 years—we may 
not even be able to assume that human life will exist. While the value of these potential lives is not 
excluded from the bound of justice and should be weighted equally, any obligations we have towards 
them—in the ‘ought implies can’ sense—correspond to our (expanding) ability to influence them.  
 
1.2.3 The Metric of Intergenerational Justice  
The final question, and the concern of this thesis, is that of ‘metric.’ If we assume that the 
interests of all people matter equally, and that, let’s say, we can affect their interests into the next 
500 years, we are still tasked with determining what exactly this equality consists of. The metric 
question asks us, then, to demarcate the ‘currency’ of justice (Cohen 1989), the evaluative grounds 
upon which we assess the distribution of burdens and benefits. As we shall see in Chapter III, 
answers to the intergenerational metric question tend to correspond with metric justice between 
contemporaries: preference satisfaction, resources, or capabilities are proposed as the relevant 
currency, the thing that no one, regardless of their year of birth, should have more or less (or less 
than a sufficient amount) of. In Chapter III, I will survey contemporary responses to the metric 
question, but first I will hone in on the particular component of the currency of justice—SCNC—
that I am interested in defending.  
 As my introduction illustrated, I am concerned with a particular subset of environmental 
goods that are, arguably, non-substitutable components of intergenerational justice. We certainly 
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talk as if places like the Whanganui River are a required ingredient in basket of goods we should 
leave the future, but what, exactly, does it mean to mark these places as non-substitutable?  The 
primary debating forum for this question is the literature on sustainability: ecologists and 
environmentalists deem some aspects of our world non-substitutable, and in doing so attend to the 
‘metric question,’ making claims as to the normatively significant features of the world that are an 
essential component of our bequest.   
 Thus, I turn now to the discourse on sustainability to more critically consider the features of 
SCNC that might warrant its inclusion within the metric of intergenerational justice. In order to 
defend that things like the Whanganui River are a feature of intergenerational justice, I must argue 
there is some ethical reason that a world without them would be unjust. One way of doing this is to 
determine that, just as the Whanganui River is of non-substitutable value to humans now, it will also 
be of non-substitutable value to humans in the future—if future people go without this place, they 
will have, through no fault of their own, been treated unfairly in some regard, and injustice obtains. 
If, on the other hand, these resources are substitutable, then it may not be a concern of justice that 
we preserve them. The focus of the rest of this chapter, then, is unpack this notion: the concept of 
substitutability—one more rooted in the sustainability literature than the ethical one—warrants 




1.3 Sustainability and the Metric Question  
To begin, a word on how I conceive of the relationship between sustainability and 
intergenerational justice. Since the 1987 Brundtland Report, sustainability and the related term 
‘sustainable development’ have become powerful catch-all phrases multifariously defined and 
implemented. Some have suggested that sustainability in its myriad forms is an ineffective concept 
(Beckerman 1994), while others have advocated for a move towards ‘resilience’ as the operational 
concept in environmental management, a theory that emphasizes a system's capacity to respond and 
bounce back from stressors and shocks (Redman 2014).  I am not concerned with these matters here. 
Despite definitional disagreement, however, the concept of sustainability, in its incorporation of 
both ecological and normative concerns, is a useful tool for our discussions of intergenerational 
justice: whether intergenerational justice obtains hinges upon the conditions future people inherit, 
which in turn is dependent on what we decide to sustain. There, are, of course, other non-
environmental acts of intergenerational injustice—leaving posterity with overwhelming debt, for 
example—but as argued by Brian Barry (1999), sustainability of some variety seems at least a 
necessary condition for acting justly towards the future. I take on the same assumption: 
intergenerational justice cannot obtain without sustainable practices, which, as conceived of in the 
Brundtland report, requires that the “needs” of future people are met.  
As I proceed with a discussion in which intergenerational justice and sustainability are 
central themes, at this point we can make a definitional decision as to whether sustainability is both 
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a necessary and sufficient condition upon our fulfilment of our environmental intergenerational 
duties:  
1. Our concept of sustainability could be strong enough to be a jointly necessary and 
sufficient condition upon (environmental) intergenerational justice.  
2. Sustainability could be only necessary for intergenerational justice. In this sense, it 
does not offer a full account of intergenerational environmental obligations. We 
(might) have additional environmental obligations of this kind which must be 
fulfilled in order to pass the test of intergenerational justice, but sustainability need 
not concern itself with these things.  
 
I adopt the former approach. It is ill-fitting to divorce our definition of sustainability from 
intergenerational justice in the way endorsed by Option 2: if indeed sustainability explicitly concerns 
itself—as suggested by the Brundtland Report—with fairness between generations, it is most useful 
to see sustainability as analogous with the environmental component of intergenerational justice, 
and flesh out a robust concept of sustainability accordingly. If sustainability is to be one guiding and 
mitigating constraint on current action, it is not prudent to water it down by analyzing 
intergenerational justice and sustainability as separate axiological goals. In this sense, the principles 
of intergenerational justice determine definition of sustainability, not the other way around. If this 
is true our current characterizations of sustainability can tell us a lot (but, perhaps, not all) about 
what we tend to think of as important components of intergenerational justice. Sustainability may 
well need augmenting once philosophy determines what, exactly, fairness between generations 
looks like, however the literature on sustainability provides the language and terms to discuss 
normative intergenerational concerns. I take ‘sustainability’ and related concepts, then, to be a 
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reasonable starting point from which to begin conversations about the environmental component of 
intergenerational justice.  
 
1.4 Weak vs Strong Sustainability 
One such concept, already featured in this thesis, is ‘non-substitutability.’ Non-
substitutability, as applied to the environment, refers to certain ecological goods that are a 
requirement of sustainability: things like clean air and water or healthy topsoil. It is disputed, 
however, whether such goods exist—an endorsement of substitutability marks the central contrast 
between ‘weak,’ and ‘strong’ sustainability, which can be roughly distinguished as follows.  
1. Weak Sustainability: No natural resource is, in theory, non-substitutable. Passing the 
litmus test of sustainability requires only that we provide apt replacements for any 
resources we use up.18   
2. Strong Sustainability: There is some ‘critical natural capital’ (CNC) that is a non-
substitutable feature of the requirements of sustainability. There is some valuable ‘stuff,’ 
in the world, that, if destroyed, will make future people “worse off than they would have 
been had the items been protected—even if they are more wealthy than their ancestors” 
(Norton 2005, 321). 
 
I will not offer a defense of one definition here, rather, as noted, the scope of sustainability will 
depend upon what we decide intergenerational justice looks like, although it should be clear that we 
must adopt strong sustainability if the preservation of natural artifacts such as the Whanganui River 
are to be features of intergenerational justice. Once again, however, we can still use the language of 
                                                 




sustainability to help us talk about intergenerational justice: if we determine what, as a matter of 
fairness, must (non-substitutability) persist for intergenerational justice, we’ve perhaps come up 
with an operational definition of sustainability, although that is not the goal of this project. 
Any further discussion of sustainability beyond strict substitutability (weak sustainability) 
will then require that we isolate CNC. The environmental scientists who work to pinpoint CNC often 
identify as critical a wide range of ecological goods19 from topsoil to ozone. Some regard is paid to 
‘information’ services—aspects of the natural world which contribute directly to non-survival 
components of human wellbeing—but differences between the CNC necessary for basic human life 
and the CNC necessary for a flourishing human life are rarely highlighted (Chiesura and de Groot 
2003, 223); the sociocultural value of natural spaces is presented as one sub-category of CNC as a 
whole (Feld et al. 2009). Cultural ecosystem services—clearly a critical component of (present day) 
human wellbeing—are often underrepresented in discussions of sustainability and subsequent 
valuations of ecosystem services: the intangible, ineffable, and incommensurable nature of such 
goods make their measurement—and thus their incorporation into conservation policy—more 
difficult (Hernández-Morcillo, Plieninger, and Bieling 2013).   
 
                                                 
19See Ekins (2003) for a classic example.  
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1.4.1 Basic vs Sociocultural Natural Capital  
Before moving on, then, let’s clarify the distinction that motivates this thesis. There are two 
varieties of CNC:    
1. Biological Critical Natural Capital (BCNC): The subset of Critical Natural Capital that 
is necessary for a decent standard of human life and basic life-sustaining functions.20 
2. Sociocultural Critical Natural Capital (SCNC): Critical Natural Capital necessary for 
‘cultural’ ecosystem services, the type that “provides the socio-cultural context for 
human society in terms of non-materialistic needs, e.g. health, recreation, scientific and 
educational information, cultural identity, source of spiritual experience or aesthetic 
enjoyment”(Brand 2009, 606). In general this refers to natural heritage: areas like 
Yellowstone, World Heritage Sites, sacred rivers and lakes, valued forests—areas that 
are essential to the wellbeing of individuals and communities.21 
 
My purpose in this section is to point to crucial divergences in the kind of substitutability present in 
these two types of ecosystem services. This is necessary work prior to my defense, in Part IV, of the 
claim that these valuable sociocultural ecological goods—SCNC—are a required (non-
substitutable) component of what we ought to leave for the future. In focusing on SCNC, I concern 
myself generally, then, with places. I do not, for instance, consider the justice claims of individual, 
sentient animals (Singer 1973) or biodiversity generally, nor do I concern myself with broader 
ecosystems (e.g. Arctic Tundra). Rather, I am interested in the intergenerational value of localized 
sites, with boundaries of varying size that are seen, by specific communities, as discrete and valuable 
                                                 
20 See Ekins (2003) and Victor, Hanna, and Kubursi (1998) for characterizations of CNC that tend to emphasize BCNC. 
21I benefit here from Satz et al.’s (2013) foundational work on the concept of cultural ecosystem services.  See also 
Chiesura and de Groot (2003).  
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entities. A more comprehensive definition is not required; a colloquial understanding of ‘place,’ will 
suffice in delineating the kind of spaces I am interested in.  
Importantly, I am concerned in this thesis only with aspects of the environment that are 
valued positively. Nature is not unequivocally good for (or to) humans: plants can poison us, animals 
can kill us, and natural disasters have perpetually damaged human populations. Some commentators, 
for instance, support the ‘biophobia hypothesis,’ (Hartig et al. 2010, 143) the suggestion that nature, 
generally, elicits negative, often fearful responses. It does not, however, make sense to claim that 
SCNC is the kind of thing that could exhibit net negative value. The Whanganui River, of course, 
can—mostly due to frequent flooding—be a harmful force. It does not fit, however, to say that 
natural place could be of negative sociocultural value. This is not the case with all token objects; 
Confederate statues in America’s South, for example, might have a net negative worth. I cannot, 
however, come up with a natural analogy, and thus the remainder of my discussion is addresses the 
positive role that SCNC plays in human lives.  
 Note too that the same natural object can be an instance of BCNC and SCNC. The 
Whanganui River Report, for instance, repeatedly notes that the river “is a subject of veneration as 
well as a source of physical and material sustenance and that there is no inconsistency between the 
two” (Tribunal 1999, 301).22 It is difficult to disentangle the sociocultural value of a place from the 
value of that resource as a source of basic sustenance. Consider, for instance, the practice of fishing 
                                                 
22This point is also highlighted in the Whanganui River Report (1999) at 5, 75, 80, 351. 
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for eel and lamprey along the Whanganui—this activity provides material benefits such as basic 
nourishment, but is also a practice of spiritual and cultural importance.23 It is not as if the features 
of the natural world I am concerned with are neatly separated into BCNC and SCNC. I distinguish 
between them in this thesis, however, to point to a contrast—oft overlooked in the literature on 
sustainability—between the kind of substitutability exhibited by each kind of natural good, a 
division that becomes important as we consider what specific physical things are, indeed, non-
substitutable  components of intergenerational justice. If, indeed, sustainability is at least a necessary 
condition for intergenerational justice, and if sustainability requires determining what, exactly, is 
non-substitutable with regard to futurity, then we must fully expound how ecological goods come 
to hold their status as non-substitutable. It is to this task I turn next.   
 SCNC is crucially distinct from BCNC in (at least) two ways. First, it is manifested in 
specific, token places and for specific people or peoples. Second, the value of these ecological spaces 
is constructed by the people inhabiting them; they are not universally valuable features of a human 
life (Fischer and Eastwood 2016; Chapin et al. 2006). Put simply, SCNC is non-substitutable 
because human communities have deemed it such—the value of such places does not necessarily 
correlate with its specific physical features. BCNC, not the other hand, is non-substitutable merely 
because we do not—and might never—have the information or technology to provide substitutes 
for the distinctive physical services it provides. 
                                                 
23Satz et al. (2013) notes the same overlap, and mention hunting as a similar example.  
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To the first point: SCNC, the features of the natural world that undergird culture, recreation, 
and general well-being, are not easily abstracted: to conceive of them requires pointing at particular 
token features of the world that are non-substitutable to particular groups.  Archie Taiaroa, in the 
Whanganui River Report (1999), for instance, says:          
Our people are tired, they’re fed up, they feel embarrassed to come along continually and to 
say who they are, what is theirs. And you would have seen [on the site visit] some ... [of] our 
people living along the river ... getting their spiritual, their physical and their material 
sustenance from the river. And you see where they’re located and then having to come and 
spend over a hundred years trying to say ‘This is us, this is what we’re trying to hold onto, 
this is what we have for our future generations (5). 
 
Taiaroa denies here that anything other than that specific river could fulfil the same cultural and 
spiritual function. This kind of localized specificity is not required of BCNC, which emphasizes 
broader systems such as oceans, ozone, and a stable climate.  
Second, there is a difference between the kind of value exhibited by BCNC and SCNC. 
BCNC is, for the most part, universally valuable to all humans, whereas the value of SCNC is 
bestowed by the individuals inhabiting a place.24 I can say with full confidence that a flourishing 
vegetable garden can provide human nourishment, but I am less confident as to the features of a 
resource that necessarily give rise to spiritual experience or cultural identity.  We can imagine, for 
instance, technology that might replace our need for what is now deemed critical: masks to breathe 
polluted air, artificial topsoil, or a reengineered climate. While the products of a vegetable garden 
                                                 
24For a case study examining how one ecosystem can be valued differently by different individuals, see Martín-López 
et al. (2012). 
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could be easily and justly substituted in most cases with some alternative product—a McDonald’s 
burger or even other vegetables shipped from across the world—the thought of substituting the 
Whanganui River with some other natural space or a virtual reality substitute is less palatable. The 
point, again, is that the claim of non-substitutability for BCNC is technological—we simply might 
never have the science or technology to find a replacement—whereas the non-substitutability of 
value-laden natural heritage is a construction of the societies in which these things exist. We know, 
for instance, that culture and education play a profound role in the development of one’s preferences 
and attachment to natural spaces (Buijs, Elands, and Langers 2009). BCNC, then, is valuable for 
humans generally, whereas SCNC is constructed over long historical timelines as valuable to 
specific groups of humans. 
An example to illustrate: the 1830 Indian Removal Act was only possible because it failed 
to recognize the distinction between SCNC and BCNC. Andrew Jackson clearly does not consider 
localized non-substitutability: 
Can it be cruel in this Government when, by events which it cannot control, the Indian 
is made discontented in his ancient home to purchase his lands, to give him a new and 
extensive territory, to pay the expense of his removal, and support him a year in his new 
Abode? (Jackson 1830). 
 
Jackson’s endorsement of relocation of the Choctaw and the Chickasaw assumes the vegetable 
garden/burger kind of substitutability —that which BCNC exhibits. We might charitably25 say that 
                                                 
25 Jackson may have been deliberately malicious, aware of his conflation of BCNC and SCNC. Regardless, his disregard 
for the difference is illustrative.  
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he acknowledged that the Native Americans ought to have a place to live, ought to have access to 
the ecological goods required for human life, but saw any place to be just as good as their ancestral 
homes in Alabama and Mississippi—an oversight we’ve since deemed intolerable. To reiterate: 
SCNC exhibits a stronger kind of non-substitutability manifested in specific, token features of the 
world which have been constructed as valuable for individual communities. BCNC, in contrast, is 
universally valuable for human life and the functions it provides do not require it to be the token 
thing that it is.  
 
1.5 ‘Nature,’ Persistence, and the Metric Question 
As I begin talking about the persistence of some natural spaces being non-substitutable, it is 
worthwhile to carefully consider how I am using terms like ‘nature,’ and ‘persistence.’ Sustainability 
(and my project) runs into a particularly vexing dilemma: on one hand, we are explicitly concerned 
with the maintenance of particular aspects of nature, but we must concomitantly acknowledge that 
natural capital does not persist in unaltered form. How am I to mandate that a thing should persist 
when, by very definition, that thing resists persistence?  The Whanganui River, for instance, will 
always be undergoing a certain degree of benign change and flux; this natural variability makes the 
problem of establishing ‘persistence’ more difficult. 
 Consider, in contrast, the case of what might be deemed non-substitutable sociocultural 
human capital: the great works of Picasso or Monet. When we try to preserve these token objects, 
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we worry about keeping them as close to their original form as possible: we engage in restoration 
efforts to prevent colors fading or paint chipping. I cannot endorse, however, the analogous 
commitment to saving natural capital in untouched, unedited, and static form, a position often termed 
‘absurdly strong sustainability.’26  My definition of ‘persistence’ must be intelligible in the current 
Anthropocene27—where few examples of untouched nature exist—and flexible enough to 
accommodate that much of the variability present in natural capital is benign. Moving forward, I am 
not in the business of arguing that some pristine, ‘wild’ nature ought to furnish the future world. 
Despite analogous non-substitutability between cultural and natural heritage, the connection should 
not be taken too seriously.  
Thus, when I talk about a place being non-substitutable, it is the positive functions28 of these 
places I am concerned with, functions that do not strictly supervene on physical characteristics of 
the natural good. For instance, a change in the physical characteristics of the Whanganui River—a 
natural change in its course—does not necessitate a change in its value as a place of recreational and 
spiritual activity. There, are, however, boundaries to the extent that a natural resource can change 
and still fulfill certain functions, still be considered the same token space. It is the concern of 
ecologists and relevant stakeholders to determine when these boundaries are reached, when a place 
                                                 
26See Daly, Jacobs, and Skolimowski (1995) and Beckerman (1995, 174) for the original discussion of this phrase and 
a lively debate over the terms of its use.  
27 The term Anthropocene refers to a proposed geological epoch which marks the point at which humans began to 
significantly impact earth’s systems on a broad scale.  
28As noted, I do not discuss the negative value that nature can exhibit. See 1.4.1 for explanation.   
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like the Whanganui River is damaged such that it no longer satisfies its functions, but it will suffice 
for now to posit that these limits exist. 
 
1.5.1 Measurement of SCNC   
The different kind of non-substitutability exhibited by SCNC means that such resources 
resist economic analyses (Satz et al. 2013), a factor which further motivates determining that they 
are indeed a concern of justice. The ineffable, intangible value of SCNC, which is subject to shifting 
norms and circumstances, is not easily translated into monetary terms or ecosystem services 
frameworks (Daniel et al. 2012). Recently, much important work29 has been done to translate the 
sociocultural value of these goods into dollar amounts, but most of these efforts are focused on 
current people’s preferences for SCNC. Economists ask, for instance, how much a current individual 
would be willing to pay for the presence of a cultural landscape or drinkable water from a local 
river.30  However, estimates of the value of these places do not factor in future people’s willingness 
to pay (WTP) for these resources, or if they do, they assume that the willingness of pay of future 
people will be the same proportion of their income as current people (Carson, Flores, and Meade 
2001). 
                                                 
29See Chan, Satterfield, and Goldstein (2012), Small, Munday, and Durance (2017) and Gould et al. (2015) for 
examples. 
30See Bernués et al. (2014) for one case.  
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Valuing SCNC in this manner presents a serious problem, for our WTP for environmental 
goods is subject to, in economist’s terms, ‘reference dependence,’ where “economic decision-
making is based on a value function that is defined on changes from a reference point, not on final 
outcomes. The reference point is typically construed to be the “current situation” (Horowitz 2002, 
251). As each succeeding generation conducts willingness to pay studies regarding SCNC, their 
valuation of such objects is heavily influenced by previous policies and the state of the environment 
that they are born into: they are less likely, for instance, to be willing to pay for certain environmental 
goods if such places are polluted and degraded by their predecessors. Indeed, given the way current 
WTP is often insufficient to protect environmental goods, each generation will encounter conditions 
that they will be less inclined to value or invest resources in.  
Consider, for instance, a lawmaker who has decided to forego stringent and precautionary 
environmental policy with regard to the Whanganui River, adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach. 
Water quality does indeed decline—the river moves from swimmable to wadeable. Future people, 
as most studies assume, will be willing to pay a similar proportion of their income to see 
improvements. However, these improvements are from the situation they encounter—not the 
drinkable water of year’s past. Loewenstein (1997) explores the psychological features of this claim, 
noting that while we might feel passionately that a certain species ought to exist, we care much less 
about it once it is gone. The consequence, then, is that “under reference dependence, future decision-
makers will “accept” low environmental quality that present decision-makers would want to avoid” 
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(Horowitz 2002, 251).  This is especially evident in SCNC, since, as noted, the non-substitutability 
of such places is constructed by specific communities; human need for BCNC, in contrast, is 
universal. While both BCNC and SCNC seem subject to reference dependence, there is a level of 
BCNC quality which no future people will reasonably accept, a baseline amount of such resources 
required for survival. SCNC, as the Skeptic will highlight in Chapter II, can be devalued to the point 
where it no longer exists; the ‘quality’ of SCNC we might adapt to is a world with none at all.   
This brief foray into economics points to the crucial importance of determining that SCNC 
is an object of justice, something to be considered as a mandatory ingredient in what we leave the 
future. Without presuming to criticize prevailing economic wisdom, I take a different approach: if I 
can successfully argue that the persistence of SCNC itself is a matter of justice—that these places 
are non-substitutable not only for individuals now but for individuals in the future—then we are left 
with argumentative resources to preserve it,  unrestrained by the economic difficulty of monetizing 
the preferences of future people and incorporating their unidentifiable values into our conservation 
policy (Sikora and Barry 1996, 205). The non-substitutability of SCNC for current people does not, 
though, as we shall next see, translate easily into its intergenerational non-substitutability.  
 
1.6 Substitutability, SCNC, and Future Generations 
Agreeing that Jackson’s actions in 1830, for instance, are a clear case of intragenerational 
injustice does not, however, commit you to the claim that the maintenance of SCNC—the ancestral 
home of the Choctaw, for example—is a necessary feature of intergenerational justice. There is a 
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prima facie act of injustice committed if one is quickly and fiercely denied access to the natural 
substrate of their culture, spirit, and identity, the most salient example being relocation like the 
Indian Removal Act alongside similar atrocities towards indigenous peoples in Australia and New 
Zealand.  These peoples have suffered a non-compensable harm: a member of the Whanganui Iwi 
in New Zealand, over the course of one lifetime, could go from having sovereignty over her tribe’s 
namesake river to seeing gravel extraction and navigation improvements destroy its spirit (Tribunal 
1999). 
But recognizing the wrongness of these actions does not require that we accept 
intergenerational non-substitutability—that is, it is still an open question whether justice demands 
that specific SCNC will exist in a future world. The nonconsensual taking of indigenous lands is a 
wrongdoing regardless of whether such lands are seen to be compensable in the lives of future 
people, substitutable with some alternate land or capital. In other words, the wrongness does not 
depend on the object’s status as non-substitutable: the relocation was clearly coerced and non-
consensual, ignored indigenous ownership of land, and was the source of bodily harm.  If you steal 
my car, a wrong has been committed regardless of whether I have a deep connection with the car 
and whether you later buy me another, nicer one. Likewise, the Indian Removal Act being wrong 
does not rely on the non-substitutability of the land on which the tribes lived. We can explain the 
injustice of the Indian Removal Act without reference to the non-substitutability of a specific 
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resource. The non-substitutability of ancestral lands deepens the force of the injustice, but the 
injustice does not depend on it. 
For people in the not-so near future, however, it seems that the aforementioned 
considerations—coercion, bodily harm, etc.—are no longer available as reasons why a lack of 
access to SCNC is unjust. Citizens generations hence will not have been forced or coerced off their 
sacred lands; rather, they might simply be born into a world devoid of them, slowly, as the above 
discussion on measurement highlights, come to devalue them. In the intergenerational case, we 
cannot utilize the aforementioned harms as reasons for the injustice, and may thus wonder whether 
a future world lacking SCNC constitutes an injustice at all. I turn next, then, to the case against the 







CHAPTER II  
THE INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE SKEPTIC  
 
Thus far, I’ve identified a type of ecological good—SCNC—that exhibits a kind of non-
substitutability markedly different from that shown by ecological services necessary for basic human 
life (BCNC), but nevertheless is often alluded to as a component of what we owe to the future. 
Perhaps, though, despite the common political mantra that we ought to preserve certain places “for 
our children and grandchildren”31 the lack of attention paid in the sustainability literature to SCNC 
is no mistake; rather, it simply suggests that we (or environmentalists) are wrong in thinking that 
value-laden spaces are a required features of a just endowment. In the following chapter, I will 
examine this claim. An ‘SCNC Skeptic,’ doubtful that such goods should feature among our 
intergenerational obligations, might object to the mandatory preservation of SCNC in two ways.  
First, she might contend we don’t have obligations at all towards future people, or that our 
obligations only extend to those for whom we naturally and altruistically care. Second, she might 
accept that we can act unjustly towards people in the future, but contest that denying them access to 
the SCNC that we value now constitutes an injustice. I will discuss each kind of objection in turn. I 
will respond, in this chapter, to the first set of objections, paving the way for the possibility that we 
                                                 
31Teddy Roosevelt is famously quoted saying “cherish these natural wonders, cherish the natural resources, cherish 
the history and romance as a sacred heritage, for your children and your children's children.” Additional examples 
exhibiting a concern for the future abound; consider the recent excess of apocalyptic films (Wall-E (2008), Contagion 
(2011), The Happening (2008), Tomorrowland (2015).  
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can stand in relations of justice with future people.  I will reply to a portion of the second set of 
worries—objections that question whether SCNC should be included within the metric of 
intergenerational justice, but save some particularly stubborn objections for Chapter IV, where, 
employing a Rawlsian contractual situation, I respond in full.  
 
2.1 Skepticism about General Obligations  
2.1.1 Skepticism about Future Humans Being the Subjects of Justice 
The first set of objections I will address denies that future humans are the types of beings 
that can be implicated in a theory of justice, and thus also denies the stronger claim that SCNC is a 
necessary component of a just intergenerational apportionment. Underlying arguments against the 
possibility of acting unjustly towards future people is the simple fact that, at present, they do not 
exist. This claim is most clearly declared by De George, who states, “Future generations by 
definition do not exist now. They cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer or subject of anything, 
including rights” (De George 1981, 161). A similar critique is offered by Beckerman, perhaps the 
most outspoken opponent of the possibility of intergenerational justice. He says:  
My argument is really very simple and can be summarized in the following syllogism: 
 (1) Future generations—of unborn people—cannot be said to have any rights.  
 (2) Any coherent theory of justice implies conferring rights on people.   
 Therefore, (3) the interests of future generations cannot be protected or promoted within 




Beckerman and De George deny the possibility of intergenerational justice by noting that future 
people do not seem to have rights now (1), and that having rights is a precondition for being a subject 
of justice (2). Even if we disagree that a cogent theory of justice requires the ascription of rights, it 
does require that future people have some interests or claims. Beckerman’s argument, though, still 
applies to other obligation-conferring predicates: future people do not ‘have’ interests or claims at 
present, just like, as Beckerman notes, they do not ‘have’ “two legs or long hair or a taste for Mozart” 
(Beckerman 2004, 3).  
Beckerman’s syllogism is easily countered. We can, following Jorg Tremmel (2009) object 
to (1), conceding that, while “Beckerman’s argument is correct,” it is of “minor importance. It 
reminds us that we should use future tense instead of present tense, that is, to say: ‘future generations 
will have rights’ instead of ‘future generations have rights’ (52). In other words, future humans are 
the kinds of things that will have rights in the future, when they come to exist. 32 By conferring rights 
on future people in this manner, we can deny Beckerman’s conclusion: it is not the case that future 
people cannot be implicated in a theory of justice due to their presently nonexistent rights.  
This does not, of course, provide a positive explanation of the influence of future-rights (or 
future interests) on our present obligations. A reasonable account can be offered by noting that 
obligations need not exist concomitantly with corresponding rights.  Our remarkable human ability 
                                                 




to make plans for the future engenders duties the fulfilment of which services rights or interests that 
do not exist at present. A modern adolescent, for instance, may not have the right to vote at present, 
but anticipating the future-existence of such a right has current moral implications: it would be unfair 
to proscribe the future exercise of suffrage by never informing said adolescent that she will soon be 
of voting age or by telling her that anyone who gets less than an A in Pre-Calculus (she received a 
B+) is not allowed to vote. Similarly, since I know that, after I finish this thesis, my student loan 
payments will commence, (and the loan provider has a right to receive the payment I have agreed 
to), it seems I am under a duty at present to act such that I can pay the bill. Even if the loan provider’s 
right does not exist now, I must not squander my savings: I anticipate that they will have a right to 
reimbursement in the future and act accordingly. To maintain that obligations must exist 
concurrently with the rights or interests they are interested in promoting truncates any reasonable 
understanding of moral action.  If obligations can exist which correspond to predictable future 
interests, we can offer a positive reply to Beckerman’s skepticism: the future interests of future 
people triggers current duties.  Of course, it remains to be seen whether the preservation of SCNC 
is one such duty, but at least a path has been cleared for the possibility that future people’s claims 




2.1.2 Skepticism about Reciprocity 
One might agree that future people will have rights but still harbor a worry that they are not 
the kinds of beings with whom we can stand in relations of justice due to their inability to, at present 
moment, participate in the usual reciprocal and contractual relationships that characterize some 
theories of justice.33 After all, we might agree that certain sentient animals can be wronged and 
ought to be afforded a version of rights, but reject that they are the subjects of justice per say—they 
are simply not like us in the relevant way. Our actions that influence future people might, in this 
sense, be immoral, violating obligations which correspond to future-existing interests, but not unjust 
per say. Brian Barry (1989), for instance, building on Hume’s circumstances of justice, notes that in 
order for justice to obtain between individuals, the two parties must (1) Be relative equals, (2) Be 
concerned with goods that are relatively scarce, and (3) Be characterized by a conflict regarding 
each individual’s self-oriented interests in such goods. In the case of our relationship with future, 
non-existent individuals, it seems that condition (1) does not obtain. As Barry notes, Rawls seems 
to share this worry:  
It is a natural fact that generations are spread out in time and actual exchanges between them 
take place only in one direction. We can do something for posterity but it can do nothing for 
us. This situation is unalterable, and so the question of justice does not arise (Rawls 199, 
291).  
 
In the words of Barry, then, 
 
 Whether or not the circumstances of justice obtain among nations is an empirical matter.  
                                                 
33See, for example, Ball (1985) and Laslett and Fishkin (1992) 
47 
 
They may or they may not. Whether or not they obtain between the generation of those 
currently alive at one time and their successors is a logical matter. They cannot. The 
directionality of time guarantees that, while those now alive can make their successors better 
or worse off, those successors cannot do anything to help or harm the current generation 
(Barry 1989, 189). 
 
In this sense, any positive circumstances we secure for future people are a non-obligatory ‘gift’ 
rather than fulfilling a duty of justice.  Future people, due to their inability to engage in reciprocal 
relations, to act with us in a mutually advantageous manner, cannot be the subjects of justice.   
 We can criticize justice as reciprocity on both intra and intergenerational grounds, and this 
particular worry could be averted by positing that we have justice-related obligations that do not 
require reciprocal relationships: a luck egalitarian account of intergenerational justice, as mentioned, 
would for instance act to secure the arbitrary factor of one’s year of birth does not result in 
disadvantage. However, even if we are committed to a reciprocity-based conception of justice, it 
does seem that, if we eschew a particular conception ‘reciprocity,’ future people are more easily 
incorporated. Axel Gosseries (2009), presents one account, a form of indirect reciprocity: we owe 
something to future generations because generations before gave something to us. Rawls, despite 
the aformentioned statements suggesting otherwise, makes a similar proposal:   
 Each [generation] passes on to the next a fair equivalent...This equivalent is in return for 
what is received from previous generations that enables the later ones to enjoy a better life 
in a more just society (Rawls 1971, 288). 
 
Gosseries (2009) grounds the force indirect reciprocity in an account of ‘free riding.’ In summary, 
when we do not pass on a world similar in relevant ways to the world we received, we take 
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advantage of the efforts of earlier generations to save for us an as such, “the obligation to 
reciprocate to the next generation would thus result from an obligation not to freeride to the 
detriment of earlier generations” (132). It seems then, that being a subject of justice—even on a 
reciprocity based account—does not require that parties be able to reciprocate or engage in 
mutually advantageous activities with each other.  
    
2.1.3 Skepticism about Harm: The Non-identity Problem 
Even if the Skeptic agrees that future people will have rights that elicit corresponding 
obligations, and that they furthermore can be the subjects of justice, it remains to be seen whether 
we can actually violate such rights. This is due to the famously vexing ‘Non Identity Problem,’ 
which, if taken seriously, means that we cannot harm future people. First developed in the work of 
Derek Parfit, the Non-identity problem is a dilemma resulting from three seemingly incompatible 
intuitions (Roberts 2009). The first intuition, put simply, is the commonly held insight that an act 
can only be wrong if it harms some individual person—that is, if the individual is worse off as a 
result of a particular action (Parfit 1986, 363). The second intuition is that one cannot be harmed by 
being brought into existence—except in circumstances where one’s life is so tortuous that it might 
feasibly be said that their life is ‘not worth living,’ we seem to accept that it better to live a life that 
is flawed in some regards than to not have lived at all. Third, we also seem committed to the claim 
that some acts that affect people not yet born are, in fact, wrong. Consider, in an example adopted 
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from Parfit (1982), where a nuclear-waste disposal plant will—scientific assessments unequivocally 
predict—leak in 250 years, giving thousands of people a skin condition that moderately reduces 
quality of life. Most would deem such an act wrong insofar as we are certain that future individuals 
will indeed suffer as a result of our actions now.  
These commitments collide upon considering the identity-producing effects of current 
actions.  Given the time-sensitive nature of human reproductive systems, any trivial change in the 
timing of one’s conception will likely result in the insemination of a different sperm-egg 
combination—and thus a different individual. My country’s choice of nuclear policy may seem 
entirely unconnected from the identity of a particular child born in 250 years, but that choice of 
policy was actually one causal component in the identity of those who will live during the nuclear 
leak. If, as my government convenes to discuss the new nuclear waste disposal policy, a particular 
group of young legislators must stay late at work—resulting in the delay of a romantic evening with 
their partners—the specific resulting child will be a different one than if the legislators had been 
home earlier. The legislator’s grandchildren and great grandchildren, too, will have different genetic 
material. When the nuclear waste leaks, 250 years after the initial policy debate, the set of children 
that suffer can, in some remote causal sense, attribute their existence to the nuclear policy itself.  
It seems (Intuition 3) that the nuclear waste policy did, in fact, harm people. It also seems, 
however, that they were not made worse off, for if the nuclear policy was not instituted, it is highly 
likely that they would never have been conceived at all. If the life with the skin condition is still 
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worth living—and we generally agree that people with skin conditions do, in fact, live worthwhile 
lives—the nuclear policy did not make any identifiable person worse off, for the alternative to living 
life with a nuclear waste induced skin condition is to simply not be alive at all.  
If I am to suggest that future humans can stand in relations of justice with currently living 
people, it is imperative that they can, in fact, be harmed by our actions. In other words, there must 
be some grounds intergenerational injustice: some future human must be able to lodge a complaint 
that they have been harmed. The non-identity problem challenges the very possibility of such a 
grievance. If some future human bemoans that they have suffered an injustice at the hands of some 
Act X of their predecessors, the predecessors can easily respond that Act X was a causal component 
of the complainer’s very existence. Therefore, unless our indignant future individual would have 
rather not been born, it is difficult to identify the injustice at play.   
In order to argue, as I do in Chapter IV, that the irreversible destruction of SCNC constitutes 
an injustice, I must rescue the presupposed possibility of intergenerational injustice itself.  Scholars 
have identified a number of strategies to circumnavigate the non-identity problem by putting 
pressure on one of the three intuitions outlined above. Rahul Kumar (2003), who primarily argues 
against Intuition (1)—that an individual needs to be made worse off in order to be considered 
harmed—makes two crucial moves securing the possibility that our actions now can constitute an 
intergenerational injustice. His account, in my view, sufficiently addresses the non-identity problem 
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and thus clears the way for my more specific claim that SCNC is a feature of intergenerational 
justice.  
First, Kumar notes that it is possible to wrong someone without harming them. Kumar’s 
example is a drunk driver. If a reckless alcoholic swerves onto the sidewalk, just missing you as you 
stroll along, we generally agree that you have been wronged: “there is nothing suspect about the 
claim that one has been wronged by the drunk driver (expressed, perhaps, as resentment of him or 
anger directed towards him), simply in virtue of his having, without justification, taken your life in 
his hands by exposing you, even briefly, to so serious a risk” (2003, 102). If wronging and harming 
can come apart, it is plausible that we could wrong future people without harming them—that is, 
we can wrong someone without the making them worse off than they would have been otherwise. 
If we can successfully argue that future people can be wronged—and such wronging is enough to 
constitute an injustice—we can reinstate future people well within the bounds of justice.  
Not only does intergenerational injustice not require an individual to be made worse off, 
but—this is Kumar’s second crucial insight—we need not even reference their identity as particular 
individuals. We can uphold that wronging someone is person affecting—a wrong act must be ‘wrong 
for someone,’—but maintain that determining whether an action is wrong hinges more upon their 
status as a type of being rather than a token individual. To Kumar, our obligations towards others 
are determined not because of the specific person that they are, but because of normatively relevant 
characteristics of their type. Certain and specific obligations are generated between, for instance, 
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student and teacher, child and parent, and boss and employee; characterizing these duties does not 
require we identify token individuals. To Kumar, then “that the particular psycho-physical identity 
of the person in question, at the point in time at which compliance with the duty is required, may 
still be an indeterminate matter turns out to be of no consequence, as the other retains her standing 
as a certain type to whom certain duties are owed regardless of what her token identity turns out to 
be” (112). If Kumar is right here, we can reflect on our duties towards future humans—and include 
them in our theories of justice—based on the type of thing that they are. We are not required to point 
to embodied examples of harmed humans in order to determine the general shape of our obligations.  
Even if we are not convinced by Kumar, there are numerous additional responses to the non-
identity problem. We might,  as suggested by Meyer (2016), who also tackles intuition (1), we might 
adopt a ‘threshold conception of harm,’ in which harm consists not of a person being made worse 
off at time T2 than they were at T1, but in them falling below a certain threshold. Another promising 
approach references the ‘butterfly effect,’ (Tremmel 2009, 40), noting that the non-identity problem 
attributes a strong causal link between a particular action and a particular person being born. It is 
because of the nuclear policy that a particular sperm and egg combination became realized as a 
token individual. But, clearly, there are infinite causal factors that also played a role in the birth of 
that particular person, and causality could be applied to any of these factors. In this sense, everything 
that happened prior to my birth is a causative force in my very existence.  It does not make sense to 
pick out actions which we intuitively think made a future individual worse off, and consider them 
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to be the singular cause of the individual’s existence. The non-identity problem, then, makes a claim 
about as strong as stating that the flap of a butterfly’s wings set off a tornado (Tremmel 2009, 42).  
There is much more to be said of the non-identity problem, but I take Kumar and others to 
have forged a clear enough path for me to proceed. Kumar’s wronging/harming and type/token 
distinctions allow the possibility that we can wrong future people, a final conceptual hurdle for 
intergenerational justice.  In responding to these worries, I have concluded that future people hold 
the required features to be incorporated into a theory of justice—they are the kinds of beings we can 
act unjustly towards.  I have cleared the way, then, for my more specific claim that the desecration 
of SCNC in the world of future people constitutes and injustice.  There may be further objections, 
of course, but survey of common worries regarding intergenerational justice produces no arguments 
that are fatal to my project. 
 
2.2 Skepticism about SCNC  
I hope, that this point, that I have convinced the Skeptic that it is indeed possible to stand in 
relations of justice with future people. The Skeptic might agree, however, but maintain doubts that 
SCNC is the kind of thing that we’re under a duty to preserve. BCNC, you might think—given its 
universal value and non-substitutability in the support of basic life—should be unequivocally 
considered a matter of justice, but including SCNC requires further justification. The SCNC Skeptic 
has a number of arguments at her disposal, which I will outline below. Some of the Skeptic’s more 
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easily answered questions I attend to in this chapter.  A latter set of worries—which more 
promisingly threaten the place of SCNC within the metric of intergenerational justice—are of the 
kind that require a more fully fledged description of what, exactly, intergenerational justice consists 
of and how we can derive fair principles for action. I thus save my full reply to these objections for 
Chapter IV, where respond within the framework of a Rawlsian account of intergenerational justice.  
 
2.2.1 ‘Pricelessness’ is an Error 
First the, Skeptic might note that our monetary evaluation of natural resources means that 
they are, in fact, substitutable. Indeed, we do reduce the value derived from SCNC to monetary 
terms, translate SCNC into dollar amounts which, of course, are tradable. Perhaps, then, when we 
say ‘that river is priceless,’ or ‘irreplaceable’ or ‘non-substitutable,’ what we really mean is ‘I feel 
uncomfortable putting a price on that resource.’ Would Thoreau take 800 billion dollars in exchange 
for his experience of the sublime Katahdin? Maybe. Would you take $400 million dollars in 
exchange for your ancestral home? We might be able to put a price on SCNC and, as the Skeptic 
will contend, the fact that the price is high does not mean that such places are truly non-substitutable.  
In other words, in many cases we will pay a lot for these natural experiences that we have come to 
value, or to preserve specific natural things, but this doesn’t mean—the Skeptic will claim—that 
they’re nonsubstitutable, some necessary and uncompensatable condition of living a good life.  
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This objection, which in some respects I attended to in my introduction, can be countered by 
highlighting the difference between pricelessness and substitutability. As noted by Sunstein:  
To say that a good is not fungible is not to say that it is infinitely valuable. To say that a good 
lacks substitutes is not to deny that people will give up some amount, and not more, to 
preserve it. The emphasis on incommensurability is not meant to deny that tradeoffs are 
made (Sunstein 2008, 16). 
 
Claiming, that because a good is not priceless, it is also not non-substitutable, then, is missing the 
point. Deeming something non-substitutable means that no other thing would provide a full 
replacement. Even if I was willing to sell a family heirloom for five million dollars (rendering it not 
priceless), it does not follow that the money provided a replacement or a substitute for said heirloom. 
To say that something is worth a certain amount is not to contend that such a sum would replace it, 
but to encompass that thing into a cost-benefit system for decision making. We place monetary 
value, for instance, on a human life (between four and nine million USD in the US according to 
Viscusi and Aldy (2002), but this amount does not substitute for in any relevant sense, the value of 
a person. We value money in a different way than we value places and people: as Sunstein 
summarizes, if we see the Whanganui River “as equal to some amount of money, we will have an 
odd and even unrecognizable understanding” of the value of that place (16). Despite the fact that 
SCNC is not infinitely valuable and we often translate it (as we should) into monetary terms, the 
claim that monetization entails substitutability is untenable—it would still be an injustice to 
substitute your child for the estimated nine million.  
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The economic valuation of SCNC does not imply substitutability. This discussion does not, 
of course, put forth a positive argument for non-substitutability, rather it simply defends against 
claims against it. Some things, of course, are substitutable, especially with regard to the uncertain 
future. The question of whether SCNC is a required feature of intergenerational justice remains 
open.  
   
2.2.2 SCNC is a Luxury Good 
A further critique—one that applies to both current and intergenerational debates over access 
to SCNC—is that such goods are ‘luxury items.’ Just as we are not obliged to maintain access to 
Rolex watches or Audi cars, one might contend that SCNC is an indulgence rather than a appropriate 
object for just or unjust distribution. Satz et. al. (2013) suggest three initial responses to this 
objection. First, it is widely known that above a certain income level, increases in human wellbeing 
become divorced from further economic resources: instead, relationships, culture, meaning, and 
community become predictors of happiness (Helliwell and Putnam 2005).  Second, they note that 
an argument that SCNC should be included within the bounds of justice does not entail a hierarchy 
in which SCNC ranked as just as pressing as basic life supporting systems—if, indeed, the two could 
ever come apart as neatly as I have presented them here. Third, SCNC is, in many cases, a crucial 
component in the wellbeing of low-income groups: “Remote existence values may be luxury goods, 
but other kinds of cultural values—spiritual, identity, legacy, participatory, and community, values 
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that have been built up over many centuries of interactions between people and their environment—
are anything but” (Satz et. al 2013, 681). As Satz et. al highlight, the import of the Skeptic’s worry 
here seems dependent on a romanticized conception of nature, referencing an external environment 
that does not feature prominently in the cultural and spiritual lives of individuals. The pristine ‘wild’ 
may indeed be a luxury, but SCNC, natural places which, per my introduction, undergird the basic 
flourishing of current communities, is a different kind of thing, to which the Skeptic’s objection 
does not apply.  
 
2.2.3 Whose Sustainability? 
A related point the Skeptic will make is that, if SCNC is indeed a compulsory feature of 
intergenerational justice, we will be tasked with determining which spaces, a choice which will 
necessarily privilege certain groups.  The worry might be framed as such: mandating the 
maintenance of SCNC shares too many ideological roots of an exploitative history of ‘wilderness 
preservation,’ where the maxim to preserve natural spaces resulted in the forced expulsion of 
indigenous and other marginalized groups. The very National Parks that I reference my introduction 
were, in fact, created via a nonconsensual removal of many First Nations Groups. That 
‘preservation’ is often bootstrapped to serve the interests of a particular group—a group often 
concerned with the maintenance of a pristine, untouched nature—is a worldwide phenomenon. 
Ramachandra Guha (1989) points out such a case with the example of India’s ‘Project Tiger,’ where 
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the effort to create wilderness reserves for endangered tigers “was made possible only by the 
physical displacement of existing villages and their inhabitants” (2). In New Zealand, too, 
indigenous values and environmental practices were clearly unfairly excluded from decision making 
regarding Whanganui National Park (Tribunal 2015).  Clearly, in arguing that specific places ought 
to persist, I enter uneasy terrain.  
However, historical fact of the abusive and exploitative practices of past efforts to preserve 
certain places need not count as a decisive blow against my normative argument that some places 
ought to persist. Determining what to save in a way that considers multiple ways of valuing and 
interacting with SCNC is no easy task: different spaces hold different value to different groups, and 
in a time of scarcity and population growth it is clear that not all SCNC can be mantained. The 
question of what SCNC should persist is separate, though, from the question of whether SCNC 
ought—as a matter of justice—persist at all. This worry remains potent however, and motivates my 
later use of Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ in Chapter IV: as I argue SCNC is a feature of 
intergenerational justice, I will not rely on a description of what makes nature valuable that is 
beholden to a particular group. 
 The Skeptic’s worries, it seems, are beginning to have some purchase, requiring a more in-
depth conception of intergenerational justice. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter, I will outline, 
but only superficially respond to her objections, saving a full discussion and rebuttal for Chapters 




2.2.4 Uncertainty and Paternalism 
The Skeptic will further argue our uncertainty regarding the preferences of future generations 
renders the preservation of non-essential goods superfluous at best and paternalistic at worst. 
Consider, the Skeptic will note, a group of citizens in 1400 deliberating about what they owe to the 
2017 cohort of humans. These ancestors, clearly oblivious to our current preferences and needs, 
might have—in an impressive display of forward thinking and political will—decided to save 
sufficient clay and shale such that we would be able to continue to build houses out of bricks. Little 
did they know, of course, that we would soon learn to make houses with steel nails and wood. Their 
saving attempts would have been in vain. In what is obviously a stretched analogy, the Skeptic might 
suggest the same is true for SCNC: what happens, she might quip, if we save all these spaces of 
natural value but they prefer the intensity of virtual reality video games? What if future people’s 
appreciation of ‘nature’ is enervated by the increased fiercety of natural disasters and weather events, 
such that the environment becomes a dark force we no longer value?34  
To demand that natural spaces persist as a matter of justice, the Skeptic will contend, is to 
force upon future people—whose preferences we are blind to—a narrow conception of what the 
good life consists of. Since SCNC is not universally valuable like BCNC, it is illegitimate to 
incorporate it into what we owe the future. This claim echoes treatments of SCNC within classic 
                                                 
34See Section 1.4 ‘Measurement of SCNC’ for further commentary on this process.  
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treatments of intragenerational justice: Rawls, for instance, is explicit that “the status of the natural 
world and our proper relation to it is not a constitutional essential or a basic question of justice as 
these questions have been specified. It is a matter in regard to which citizens can vote their 
nonpolitical values and try to convince other citizens accordingly” (Rawls 1993, 246). Dworkin, 
too, discussing a conflict between a “useful dam” and the preservation of a species of snail darter, 
similarly situates concern for the snail habitat as a personal preference outside the bounds of justice 
relations (Dworkin 1981, page 202). Both theorists make clear that environmental commitments are 
perfectionist in nature, and to demand public endorsement of environmental concerns is an 
unjustified enforcement of a particular, non-neutral version of the good.  
The Skeptic will transpose this worry from intra to intergenerational justice, noting that, to 
avoid paternalistically prescribing the preferences of future people, we must “keep in mind, in 
making plans, that we don’t know what they will do, what they will like, what they will want. And, 
to be honest, it is none of our business” (Solow 1991, 182). Thus, our obligations ought not 
supervene on the existence of natural objects like SCNC. Instead of particular things, then, the 
Skeptic will contend that we ought to preserve a more all-purpose metric, of the kind that I will 
explore in Chapter III. This stubborn objection, which seems to justify the general economic 




2.2.5 We Don’t Blame Our Predecessors 
The Skeptic might further object to including SCNC within the currency of justice by 
highlighting how humans have always changed and modified the natural world—perpetrating no 
apparent injustice. In fact, human-induced changes to natural landscapes have been a large source 
of the generalized increase in human welfare over the course of history (Kareiva et al. 2007). It does 
not seem reasonable to suggest that we received an unfair allocation of SCNC from our predecessors: 
I do not consider it unjust that our ancestors turned forests into farmland or changed river valleys to 
towns and cities, and I do not bemoan that I no longer have the readily available option of living in 
the forests that used to cover Dunedin, New Zealand. We ought not presume, then, that future 
generations will blame us any more than we blame them; to mandate the inclusion of SCNC hinders 
the perennial human advancement that made possible the conditions many of us enjoy today. The 
dissimilar allotment of SCNC each generation encounters is, in this sense, not a concern of justice, 
but a byproduct of progress: if anything, it would be an intergenerational injustice for our 
predecessors to have foregone the development that produced roads, bridges, hospitals, and libraries. 
Mandating room for SCNC within the ledger book of intergenerational justice impedes this sort of 
progression. This is an important objection which I hope to tackle in Chapter III and IV. To 
foreshadow, it seems as if our emergent environmental influence undermines the ability of progress 




2.2.6 Adaptation and Future Supersession 
In a related objection, the Skeptic might highlight the remarkable human ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Why should SCNC feature as part of the metric of justice if it seems as if 
humans could learn to flourish in a world without it? Martin Krieger sums up this point:   
What’s wrong with plastic trees? My guess is that there is very little wrong with them. Much 
more can be done with plastic trees and the like to give most people the feeling that they are 
experiencing nature. We will have to realize that the way in which we experience nature is 
conditioned by our society- which more and more is seen 
to be receptive to responsible interventions (Krieger 1973, 458). 
 
In further defense of this claim the Skeptic will cite research that emphasizes such adaptability or 
dismisses any substantive link between SCNC and wellbeing. Pointing to studies on ‘hedonic 
adaptation’—in which psychological processes attenuate the effect of negative circumstances on 
wellbeing (Lyubomirsky 2010)—she will contend that future people will be characteristically 
resilient in the face of ecological decline. Furthermore, she might note the ‘The Environmentalist’s 
Paradox (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010), in which recent research—most notably the 2005 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment—suggests that wellbeing is steadily increasing despite 
decreased access to ecological services. 
The Skeptic will ask us to consider the gradual demise of SCNC—the slow and continuous 
degradation of ecological goods upon which communities have built their identities. This destruction 
might be unrecognizable—indistinguishable, even, from progress. As this SCNC slowly disappears, 
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future people come to value what we leave for them:35  Citizens 500 years from now might center 
their lives and communities around severely degraded rivers, develop an aesthetic preference for 
muddy, spoilt waters, and experience no decline in subjective wellbeing.  In the same way many 
revel in the beauty of the NYC skyline, future people will rejoice their dammed rivers and removed 
mountaintops—after all, the goods produced by these practices fed and nourished people, provided 
energy, and heated the homes of the poor. The slow, irreversible ruination of valued places, 
occurring almost invisibly over decades, is, to the Skeptic, innocuous: future people, despite living 
in a world void of many places we value now, will, find new sources of sociocultural value, new 
sites of cultural, spiritual, and recreational sustenance.  The thrust of the argument here is that future 
people ‘won’t know what they’re missing,’ a claim which recalls the work of Jeremy Waldron 
(1992), who employs similar reasoning to contend past injustices—of the very  kind I am concerned 
with—can be superseded.  
Waldron himself focuses on whether injustices that occur during a particular generations can 
persist through time, which differs from examining, as I do, whether situations between generations 
themselves are just. Regardless, two varieties of Waldron’s claims are of the kind that bolster the 
contentions of the Skeptic. First, his discussion of human adaptation to changing environmental 
circumstances supports the Skeptic’s earlier points. Second, his position regarding the features of 
past injustice dispute the importance of SCNC for future generations by noting that—while the 
                                                 
35See Scholtes (2010, 291–294), and Bykvist (2009) for further commentary. 
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destruction of SCNC might be an instance of intragenerational injustice—it is not of 
intergenerational import. In other words, if Waldron is right that past injustices do not always 
endure, then it is plausible that injustices now (which will soon become in the past) could be 
superseded as well.  
Waldron makes his claim with regard to colonists taking indigenous lands—in his view, the 
indigenous entitlement to certain lands can be vulnerable to the passage of time insofar as this group 
no longer builds their life around the resource.  They have, in essence, found a replacement, the 
injustice is not permanent. Waldron (1992) maintains that, “If something was taken from me decades 
ago, the claim that it now forms the center of my life and that it is still indispensable to the exercise 
of my autonomy is much less credible. For I must have developed some structure of sustenance” 
(19). Doubtless, one could develop a structure of spiritual, cultural, and recreational sustenance as 
well.  
Waldron speaks here of the supersession of injustice within a lifetime, yet we can reasonably 
suppose that his doubts about the persistence of injustice can be transposed into intergenerational 
concerns. If an injustice can fade after just a few decades, it is certainly the case that it would fade 
after generations, when the original claimants are no longer present. Future people, unaware, 
perhaps, of the way in which SCNC was central to the lives of their predecessors, will have found 
replacements. Or, rather, we will—if we endorse substitutability—have given them replacements. 
No injustice has been committed.   
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Thus, the SCNC Skeptic might grant that these natural features are valuable components of 
current lives, and affirm the intuition that it constitutes an injustice if they are destroyed or degraded. 
However, she will note that this does not secure SCNC as an object of intergenerational justice—
fairness between generations. She will concede, as Waldron does, that “religions and cultural 
traditions we know are very resilient, and the claim that the lost lands form the center of a present 
way of life—and remain sacred objects despite their loss—may be as credible a hundred years on 
as if was at the time of the dispossession”(20).  This, though, is an instance of intragenerational 
injustice that endures, not, she might claim, an example of unfairness between generations, and thus 
ought not be included among the set of things to be distributed throughout time. In this sense, we 
can fulfil our intergenerational demands by acting justly towards our contemporaries: SCNC is not 
something we owe future people, it is something we owe each other.  
Following Waldron here, it seems that if we deprive future people of their current entitlement 
to enjoy certain benefits from the natural world, but in the future they find adequate replacements, 
that no injustice has been committed—future people will find different things to value, different 
means to realize robust human wellbeing, likely oblivious to the fact that it could have been 
otherwise.  
On what grounds, then, might we defend the intergenerational import of the Whanganui 
River? A suitable justification of the place of SCNC in intergenerational justice must offer a 
response to the Skeptic’s remaining objections: it must show that what we decide to save is not 
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derived from a particular non-neutral definitional of sustainability, that our uncertainty regarding 
the future does not render the preservation of SCNC a paternalistic restriction on future people, that 
our lack of blame for our predecessors does not excuse current environmental damage, and that 
future people’s ability to adapt to a degraded world does not undermine their claims to certain 
environmental goods.  In the following two chapters I attend to this task. First, in Chapter III, I 
examine contemporary answers to the metric question in search of readily available responses to the 
Skeptic. These replies do not, I argue provide sufficient justification for the non-substitutability of 







WHAT SHOULD PERSIST? 
 
Throughout my introduction and Chapter I, I determined that there exists a class of environmental 
goods above and beyond that necessary for basic human life which still exhibit non-substitutability 
to currently living people. It is still an open question, however, whether these natural spaces must 
exist in the future in order for justice between generations to obtain. In Chapter II, I examined a 
number of doubts that might lead us to believe that, if indeed we have any obligations whatsoever 
towards the future, the preservation of SCNC is not one of them. Are we to relax, comfortable in the 
knowledge that the preservation of the Whanganui River is optional so long as we provide apt 
substitutes?  
Perhaps existing theories of intergenerational justice offer compelling responses to the 
aforementioned objections. To see, I return to the ‘metric’ or ‘currency’ of intergenerational justice, 
investigating prominent answers to the question of what ought to be distributed throughout time. I 
take the quintessential “equality of what” question (Sen 1995), which examines the spatial 
distribution of goods, and examine the propositions of those who have asked and answered its 
temporal cousin.  I have not yet sufficiently argued that SCNC is indeed a non-substitutable 
component of the world we bequeath. Before I defend the latter claim, however, I will appraise three 
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positions36 on the ‘metric’ of intergenerational justice to determine whether current proposals 
articulate justification for the place of SCNC. Do they offer clues as to how the preservation of such 
non-basic goods can be defended to the Skeptic? My discussion below concludes that three common 
strategies—preferentialism, resourcism, and capabilitarianism—do not, on their own terms, capture 
the non-substitutability of SCNC. To put it bluntly, each of these currencies of intergenerational 
justice, as they stand, can sanction a future world in which the Whanganui River no longer exists. 
In the latter half of the chapter, I suggest that the absence of regard for SCNC is due to the methods 
we’ve employed to answer the intergenerational metric question. Account of intergenerational 
justice tend to extend metrics of spatial justice to the temporal realm, an approach which fails to 
articulate salient intergenerational concerns which are not present in relations of justice between 
contemporaries.  
 
3.1 Preference Satisfaction?  
First, one might think that intergenerational justice prevails when an ability to have one’s 
preferences satisfied is maintained throughout time. This strongly utilitarian view takes a preference 
satisfaction model of wellbeing and endorses it as the metric of our intergenerational concern: in 
other words, if the year that one is born has no effect on whether they have their desires fulfilled, 
we’ve passed the test of intergenerational equity. 
                                                 
36I follow Page (2007) in separating these three positions in this manner.  
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On first glance, preferentialism can accommodate the position that some SCNC is a non-
negotiable feature of what we owe to future people. Posterity might have a preference for clean 
rivers, for sacred places, for an ancestral home, their desires frustrated by the lack of these things. 
In the intragenerational case, if justice requires the spatial distribution of preference satisfaction, 
such that we give “equal weight to the equal interests of the occupants of all the roles” (Hare 1963, 
215), someone with a strong preference for participating in their environmental heritage could 
clearly have this desire obstructed, injustice obtaining if others’ interests in this realm are given 
priority. We might say, then, that if future people have similar desires, but ours take precedence, 
that we’ve failed to be intergenerationally just.  
This picture, though, is complicated by two aspects of our particular epistemic relation to the 
future, highlighted by the Skeptic. First, as compared with contemporaries, we have a higher degree 
of uncertainty regarding the wants and needs of future generations. This elicits a laissez faire 
approach to the preferences of the future which endorses substitutability: if we don’t know what 
they desire, intergenerational justice does not require saving any particular objects of desire, rather 
just the capacity to have desires satisfied. In the words of Solow, the champion of a preferentialist 
view, our obligations do not require that “particular species of owl or particular species of fish or 
particular tract of forest be preserved” (Solow 1991, 180). Instead of these token goods, we’re 
obligated to maintain the means to preference satisfaction, and, given our uncertainty as to the future 
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world, the most reasonable proxy for such satisfaction is a non-declining stock of capital (usually in 
the form of money) over time. This ‘stock’ of capital, though, need not be made up of SCNC.  
Second, perhaps in contrast with this uncertainty, the values and preferences of future people 
will be determined by what we leave them, a factor which significantly weakens any claim that a 
non-qualified preferentialism does account for non-fungibility. The preferences of future people 
decisively depend on the values and objects available to be preferred (Bykvist 2009). As the Skeptic 
has already noted, if SCNC is not available to be valued, or other objects have replaced its 
sociocultural function, its absence cannot count in a case of desire frustration. Future people might, 
in their view, have all their desires satisfied, but be oblivious that their preferences might have been 
otherwise. They might, to use to the example of climate change, “learn to desire the possibilities 
offered by a warmer and wetter climate. They may, that is, adapt their desires so that they become 
‘contended victims’ of climate change” (Page 2007, 445). If future people adapt to a world without 
SCNC, the preferentialist has no resources to deem the situation unjust.  
Even a stronger ‘informed’ or ‘idealized’ desire theory37 fails to capture an obligation to 
preserve SCNC, for even if future people were fully informed as to the options available to them, 
we should not imagine that ‘informed desire theory’ includes a list of all past and present options. 
It would be strange for me to complain, for instance, that my wellbeing has been compromised since 
I cannot realize my preference for being a knight or a cowboy. In the same way, if swimming in 
                                                 
37See Sidgwick (1907), Section 3 and Rawls (1971), page 417 for classic defenses.  
71 
 
rivers or viewing coral reefs becomes impossible due to the non-existence of swimmable rivers or 
reefs, such activities are excluded even from an informed desire approach. An ‘idealized’ desire 
theory surely cannot expect to accommodate what my desires would have been if my predecessors 
had left me a more robust set of options as to how to live my life. As Ott (2009) notes, “If nature 
will have been lost, a preference for unspoilt nature will be irrational—comparable to a today’s 
preference to see a living dinosaur” (Ott 2009, 144). Even the most idealized desire theory does not 
have room for preferences that are impossible to realize. Furthermore, a desire theory which did 
include this kind of information would likely result in endorsing preferences that future people don’t 
have, since, as noted, our preferences are shaped by what we have access to.  In other words, it is 
likely that we would no longer regard such ‘impossible’ options as desirable anyway.  
 The preferentialist might further claim that if we do place SCNC as obligatory, future people 
might develop preferences that are ill-fitting to the world we leave them—they might, for example, 
not value pristine wilderness or the hoot of an owl. The solution to this worry is an explicit 
endorsement of substitutability: the market’s tendency towards ‘resource optimism’ will ensure that, 
when a specific resource becomes depleted, its price will rise and it will become profitable to invest 
in a manmade substitute or create technology that can utilize a different resource for the same 
purpose (Neumayer 2002). If future people do end up with a preference for SCNC, its value too will 
increase sufficiently to ensure its protection. We see, then, that the preferentialist’s faith in resource 
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optimism, combined with uncertainty regarding the preferences of future people results in a default 
position of substitutability.  
 Preferentialism thus leaves no room for a conviction that the success of intergenerational 
justice crucially depends on a world which contains SCNC—that part of our obligation is to leave 
the things that we have come to prefer. The objects of preference satisfaction are not determined—
we might be able to say that future people will value some ‘objective’ components of wellbeing like 
freedom, enjoyment, or excelling at one’s goals, but under this model we can’t say anything about 
the physical world required to realize such values. An account of what it means for future people to 
have their preferences satisfied cannot be naturalistic, supervene on the existence of certain kinds of 
environments or means of wellbeing realization.  We can certainly try to save specific natural or 
cultural features, but the preferentialist does not require them in their intergenerational litmus test.38  
To put it another way, the intergenerational preferentialist has built success into her own 
model.39 There is no room for one to critique the objects of our preference—given a choice between 
two options, we can always elicit a preference. This is a problem for desire theories generally, but it 
becomes far more poignant in the intergenerational case: if all that’s is required for intergenerational 
justice is that future people obtain their desires, yet we are the determiners of the set of such desires 
available, we can endorse any potential set. When Solow (1993), similarly, claims “What matters is 
                                                 
38Neumayer (2007) offers a comprehensive treatment of how the preference satisfaction model, implicit in cost-
benefit analysis environmental reports such as the Stern report, cannot adequately speak to non-substitutable 
natural capital.  
39Norton (2005) puts forth a similar analysis and critique of Solow.  
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not the particular form that the replacement takes, but only its capacity to produce the things that 
posterity will enjoy” (168), he misses is that our capacity is not only to produce things, but also to 
produce requisite desires for things. Under this logic whatever we produce will be desirable, or 
perhaps more accurately, we can produce whatever we want since ‘preference’ does not include an 
evaluation or attitude but merely a choice between two presently-available options (Bykvist 2009). 
SCNC need not be one of those options.  
 
3.2 Resources? 
Trying to directly measure justice via preference satisfaction is difficult in present-day 
deliberations, but impossible in the case of future generations. This has led scholars of 
intergenerational justice to posit that the currency of our future-oriented obligations is the goods—
the collection of social, human, and natural capital—that we leave for posterity. Rather than our 
obligations being concerned with bequeathing preference satisfaction itself, we are 
intergenerationally just if we provide for the future the means to realizing one’s desires: some set of 
impersonal goods such as polluting capacity or capital. For example, although Rawls himself did 
not formulate it as such,40 his successors have argued for the intergenerational distribution of 
primary goods: those commodities, such as basic rights and liberties, and human or natural capital, 
that any rational person “prefers more rather of than less of” (Rawls 1971, 123). A Dworkinian view 
                                                 
40Chapter IV will provide a fuller explanation of Rawl’s theory of intergenerational justice. 
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similarly might posit a kind of ‘intergenerational auction,’ where the bundle of goods afforded to 
each generation must be such that no generation envies another (Dworkin 1981b, 285). Meanwhile, 
a developing field of ‘ecological space,’ utilizes concepts like ‘carbon footprint’ to argue 
intergenerational justice obtains when one generation is not allotted more carbon-burning capacity 
than another.  
In highlighting goods that are of universal human value such as income, wealth, or capital, 
the general family of resource-based responses to the metric question have, like preferentialism, 
significant trouble speaking to the specific, decisively personal non-substitutability of SCNC. 
Generally, the composition of goods we bequeath is of little concern: losses in natural capital can be 
offset by increases in human capital—libraries, hospitals, and other infrastructure. Barry, for 
instance, asserts that intergenerational justice consists of equal ability to produce over time. Since 
the resources we leave will necessarily be different in composition than those that we received, when 
we use up a specific resource future generations “should be compensated  in the sense that later 
generations should be left no worse off (in terms of productive capacity) than they would have been 
without the depletion” (Barry 1989, 519).  Passing Barry’s test of intergenerational justice does not 
require that SCNC continue to exist, for, as we’ve seen, the value of SCNC is not a function of 
‘productive capacity.’ In fact, in Barry’s scheme, the destruction of sites of sociocultural value might 
be in service of intergenerational justice: destroying sites of SCNC is just the kind of act that can 
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increase the productive capacity of at least a few future generations. Barry would find nothing wrong 
with this arrangement.   
Even varieties of resourcism that do not assume total substitutability—and rather see human 
and natural capital as complimentary—often focus their attention on technologically non-
substitutable BCNC, with little attention paid to value-laden places that are not necessary for bare 
bones human life.  One such metric is that of ‘ecological space,’ which offers a promising 
modification of resourcism specifically designed to attend to the contemporary demands of 
intergenerational justice.  Steve Vanderheiden unpacks the position, which provides a fruitful 
critique of Rawlsian and Dworkinian proposals. While an intergenerational metric of ecological 
space is sensitive, unlike a metric of Rawlsian or Dworkinian ‘social primary goods,’ to the 
intergenerational distribution of BCNC, it does not, as we shall see, articulate an obligation to protect 
spaces like SCNC which give rise to higher order human flourishing.  
Vanderheiden (2009) begins by noting that the liberal commitment to autonomy can conceal 
the way in which our use of even equally allocated primary goods can infringe upon the freedoms 
of others. “By making instrumental economic goods the objects of egalitarian distribution,” he says, 
“and decisions regarding how those goods are used the core element of individual autonomy, 
egalitarian justice theories like those of Rawls and Dworkin obscure the potentially wide variation 
in claims on ecological space that results from the way that people use their just shares of goods” 
(Vanderheiden 2009, 267).  
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 Vanderheiden hints that this oversight has to do with the ‘objects’ of conventional justice 
theories. While Rawls and Dworkin are primarily concerned with social primary goods—the kind 
of thing produced by shared cooperation—they ignore the distribution of things that we did not 
produce, namely, natural resources. Natural resources, unlike social primary goods, have finite 
limits: a larger allocation of these kinds of goods for one party (or generation) entails a smaller 
allocation for another. These zero-sum resources are not, then, of the kind that can be unequally 
distributed but still result in benefits for the disadvantaged via a larger overall share, Rawls’ classic 
maximin rule.  
In light of this insight Vanderheiden suggests that the metric of intergenerational justice be 
some measure along the lines of an ‘ecological footprint,’ “the amount of the planet’s surface area 
needed to sustain our demand for environmental goods and services at average levels of biological 
productivity” (260). Simply put, intergenerational justice means that no generation is afforded a 
greater share of this space. To illustrate, he notes that, given a global population of 6.7 billion and 
an average ecological footprint of 1.5 hectares, we are running at an ecological dept of .4 
hectares/person given the finite 8.9 billion available hectares. To be in ecological dept of this kind 
is, in Vanderheiden’s scheme, is to be intergenerationally unjust.   
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Even Vanderheiden’s more intergenerationally specific proposal, sensitive to the finite 
nature of natural capital can, however, still endorse a world without SCNC.41 Perhaps each 
generation is allocated an equivalent ability to emit carbon, an equal amount of ecological space,42 
but this bequest says nothing about which spaces. If intergenerational justice consists of equally 
allocating carbon burning capacity, we could consider ourselves acting justly towards the future 
while meanwhile allowing that token places like the Whanganui River are irreversibly damaged.   
Resourcism in its many stripes suffers from this inadequacy, summarized by Amartya Sen:  
The translation of resources into the ability to do things does vary substantially from person 
to person and from community to community, and to ignore that is to miss out on an 
important general dimension of moral concern (Sen 1997, 322). 
 
 As Sen highlights, a resourcist view cannot accommodate my concern with specific resources of 
the kind that are non-substitutable towards a particular way of life. An emphasis on resources does 
not explicitly command the preservation of the Whanganui River, the Everglades, the sacred 
homeland of the Choctaw; it does not speak to the importance of such places, and can endorse a 
world without them.  
 
                                                 
41Vanderheiden may well not be proposing the ecological space is the only relevant currency of intergenerational 
justice, and his claims are not incompatible with also maintaining SCNC. Indeed, his work is oftentimes more 
concerned with intragenerational (international) allocation. The point, though, is that positing ecological space as 
the evaluative metric of intergenerational justice does do any work to justify that SCNC ought to be a required 
feature of what we leave the future.  
42This proposal would, of course, need to take into account population increases, for an equal amount of ecological 




Intergenerational capabilitarianism, motivated by the shortcomings of declaring impersonal 
goods the evaluative standard of justice, sets out to chronicle a more comprehensive set of 
intergenerational obligations. Recent scholarship extending the capabilities approach to 
intergenerational concerns gestures at the significance of SCNC, yet, as we shall see, this work 
generally eschews a commitment to non-substitutability, leaving, once again, places like the 
Whanganui River outside the bounds of justice.  
Let’s inspect some central features of the capabilities approach (CA), focusing on its 
paradigmatic development in the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, before examining 
what an intergenerational variant might look like. The CA is a response to the aforementioned worry 
that an equal distribution of resources does not, in fact, result in substantive equality: some people 
living in harsh environments, for instance, require a greater amount of resources to have access to 
the same ‘realistic option of exercising the most valuable functions’ (Nussbaum 2000, 46). Another 
classic illustration notes that a woman in a wheelchair and her able-bodied friend might have an 
equal set of assets—the same salary at the same job—but the former may still experience a lower 
quality of life due to her handicap: she cannot as efficiently convert her resources into what Sen 
calls ‘doings and beings.’ The problem with resourcism, then, is its focus on the means of a good 
human life, rather than the ends (Sen 2013). 
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To correct this failing, Sen first notes that good lives tend to consist of access to certain 
valued functionings. These functionings are the ‘beings and doings’ constitutive of a dignified 
human life: we value ‘being nourished,’ ‘being part of a community’ and we value ‘doings’ like 
‘celebrating my culture,’ or ‘voting.’ Realistic access to these types of activities is the kind of thing 
that makes life go well. Note that resources are often necessary for these functionings. Sen uses the 
example of a bicycle: while a bike might be useful for ‘being mobile,’ it’s usefulness towards that 
end depends on the person trying to use it: a bike does not universally secure functional 
transportation if the owner doesn’t know how to use it or has physical or environmental constraints 
(Sen 1992, 161). 
The normatively important comparative standard of justice, then, is an individual’s relative 
bundle of capabilities. Capabilities are defined as authentic access to valuable ‘functionings,’ the 
real freedom to achieve valuable beings and doings. While we may, at any given time, exercise a 
specific, narrow set of functionings that undergird our wellbeing, Sen places normative importance 
on the set of realistic capabilities available to an individual—regardless of which functionings one 
participates in, the metric of concern is those functionings which one could engage in, a kind of 
“well-being freedom” (Sen 1992, 40). There is a moral difference, then, between an individual who 
has realistic access to riding a bike to work and an individual who does not—even if neither person 
is interested in making use of this option. Scholars of the CA flesh out the content of these ‘valued 
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functionings,’ differently,43  but all assert that true equality consists of an equal distribution of the 
capability to achieve such ‘beings and doings.’  
Such capabilities, in general, require the conversion of resources into valued functionings, 
and as such the CA specifies a number of ‘conversion factors’ that influence an individual’s ability 
to make use of the resources at her disposal (Sen 1992, 19).44 These conversion factors tend to be 
divided into three types: personal, social, and environmental (Robeyns 2005, 90). Personal factors 
are unique to individuals: characteristics such as intelligence, sex, weight, and the like can 
profoundly affect one’s ability to transform resources into functionings. Social conversion factors 
are those of the community in which one lives: the sociopolitical context which—through codified 
policies and social norms—defines how effectively resources translate into beings and doings. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for my purposes, are environmental conversion factors. The 
physical space one occupies—both the built and natural environment—has significant influence on 
the usefulness of resources; differences in climate, proneness to natural disasters, pollution, and 
access to water are all mitigating factors (Schlosberg 2012, 454).  
Let’s now examine what an intergenerational version of the capabilities approach might 
entail, and return to my central question of whether intergenerational capabilitarianism features 
SCNC as non-substitutable. If capabilities are the pertinent evaluative currency, intergenerational 
                                                 
43Nussbaum (2013), for instance, has a list of ten basic capabilities such as life, bodily health, and bodily integrity, 
whereas Sen does not endorse a particular set.  
44See also Sen (1992), pages 26–30, 37–38. 
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justice obtains if all people, regardless of birthdate, enjoy roughly similar45 sets of capabilities to 
achieve valued functionings. Whether places like the Whanganui River are non-substitutable 
towards achieving these valued functionings, then, turns on what exactly, we consider ‘valued 
functionings’ to be, and whether we could achieve those same functionings without the presence of 
SCNC. In other words, does a decline in the SCNC available to a specific generation necessarily 
constitute a decline in their capabilities? If we can answer in the affirmative, the CA might do the 
work of including SCNC within our intergenerational obligations.  
Despite this potential, substitutability is explicitly endorsed by Sen, who echoes the language 
of Solow:                
Preserving productive capacity intact is not, however, an obligation to leave the world as we 
found it in every detail. What needs to be conserved are the opportunities of future 
generations to lead worthwhile lives. The fact of substitutability (in both production and 
consumptions) implies that what we are obligated to leave behind is a generalized capacity 
to create well-being, not any particular thing or resource (Anand and Sen 2000, 2035). 
 
Our moral obligation here is general, unconcerned with the specific task of designating what we 
ought to save. In the same article, Sen endorses the economic approach developed by Hicks and 
Hartwick as an indicator of whether we’ve fulfilled our duties towards the future: if we invest the 
rents (capital left over after production is paid for) from resource extraction or environmental 
degradation into other forms of capital (from planting trees to building schools and advancing 
                                                 
45Nussbaum’s theory is sufficientarian: every individual must be above the particular threshold of capabilities 
required to live a dignified life. Sen, on the other hand, holds that justice consists of each individual holding an equal 
capability set.  
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technology), we allow “future generations to sustain indefinitely the income, or capacity of 
consume, of the present generation” (2036).  
If we take Sen’s commitments here to the view endorsed by his capabilities approach, SCNC 
is clearly not an obligatory component of intergenerational justice. It does seem, though, that Sen’s 
more recent work diverges from assuming substitutability. Indeed, Sen, who never systematically 
considers intergenerational justice, does propose that we ought to preserve “the substantive freedoms 
and capabilities of people today without compromising the capabilities of future generations to have 
similar – or more – freedom” (Sen 2004, 2). As Sen (2004) comes to note, a commitment to such 
freedoms requires a view of intergenerational obligation that is more substantial than a non-declining 
stock of capital, but he does not go so far as to describe what kind of physical world is required to 
secure the capabilities of future people.  
Additional commentators such as Breena Holland (2008), Krushil Watene (2013), and 
Edward Page (2007) have experimented with bolstering the capabilities approach such that it more 
adequately speaks to intergenerational concerns. Page, for instance, offers two suggestions for a 
charitable reconstruction. First, in light of humanity’s increasing control over the status of the natural 
world, we might add a capability: Page suggests ‘ecological functioning,’ the “capability to 
experience life in an environment devoid of dangerous environmental impacts such as those 
associated with climate change. Here, we view a safe and hospitable environment as a vital 
ingredient of a decent life rather than a facilitator of other functionings” (464).  As characterized by 
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Page, however, this additional capability does not get us quite as far as considering SCNC as an 
object of justice; he seems most concerned with ‘dangerous’ environmental impacts of the kind 
associated with BCNC.  
Second, we might augment existing capabilities, noting how they depend on a functioning 
environment or certain ecological goods. For instance, Page suggests that environmental 
degradation could destabilize existing capabilities such as health and bodily integrity, functionings 
that “will be threatened even if the share of primary goods and ecological space available to future 
generations is at least as generous as that enjoyed by the present generation” (464). Furthermore, 
justice involves “recognizing the claims of the disadvantaged even if their welfare is as high as 
others. On this view, we should value a hospitable environment because it is an integral feature of a 
life of decent quality and not because it facilitates desire satisfaction” (465). Page’s suggestions here 
does seem to get us part way towards non-substitutability by noting that the CA can avoid the 
‘adaptive desires’ problem exhibited by preferentialists and the problem of translating resources into 
wellbeing.  Page gestures at non-substitutability here—there are some capabilities which will be 
undermined even if future people have an equal allocation of ecological space or equal desire 
satisfaction. In this way, the capabilities approach has the conceptual resources to suggest that an 
injustice has occurred even if futurity experiences similar levels of welfare or resources by adapting 
to an environmentally degraded world.  
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However, the place of SCNC within the capabilities of futurity is not yet clear. Is the 
Whanganui River the type of thing that—if irreversibly damaged—will undermine the identifiable 
capabilities, the ‘decent life’ of future people? Even these intergenerationally sensitive versions of 
the CA fall short of any real injunction to preserve SCNC due to the ambiguity of whether the 
relative evaluative currency is functionings that ‘they’ (future people) have reason to value, or 
functionings that we have reasons to value. The former, paralyzed by our uncertainty regarding what 
such people actually will value, might endorse the preservation of only those functionings that we 
can reasonably predict will be of value to the future: being nourished, being hydrated, being safe. 
Under this metric, our obligations would extend no further than BCNC. Furthermore, if 
intergenerational equity requires that future people have a roughly equal set of options to achieve 
functionings that are valued to them, it is subject to the same ‘adaptive desires’ problem as 
preferentialism: as SCNC is degraded and destroyed, interaction with such spaces becomes less like 
the kind of thing one has reason to value—placing SCNC well outside the evaluative space of justice.  
On the other hand, if we are concerned with maintaining a set of capabilities that include 
among the menu of functionings those capabilities that current humans have reason to value, SCNC 
might be implicated as non-substitutable. In this instance intergenerational justice would consist of 
future people having realistic access to the beings and doings that we value now, alongside additional 
capabilities that might arise in the future. As far as I am aware, this distinction, which could articulate 
reasons for the non-substitutability of SCNC, has not been systematically discussed within the 
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capabilities literature, although Krushil Watene does note that such a claim would be rife with 
conflict. Protecting those future capabilities might come with a reduction of current people’s set of 
available functionings, and contemporary accounts of the capabilities approach provides little 
guidance as to how we might adjudicate between current and future capabilities (Watene 2013, 34).  
As it stands, without conceptual reinforcement, capabilitarianism does not speak robustly to 
the obligation to preserve token ecological spaces. It does, however, come the closest to providing 
a justification for an obligation to preserve SCNC, and as we shall see in Chapter IV, I draw on some 
of the insights of the capabilities approach in my defense of SCNC within intergenerational justice.  
Thus far, then, I’ve shown that the three most common answers to the intergenerational 
‘equality of what’ question encounter significant difficulty accounting for the non-fungibility of 
SCNC. Extending traditional ‘metrics’ of intragenerational justice does not provide specific 
guidance as to what we owe to the future: unqualified, each of the three theories I examined all allow 
for the slow degradation of places that we have reason to value. My search within existing literature 
for a cogent and conclusive justification for the intuition that SCNC ought to persist has come up 




3.4 A New Approach?  
3.4.1 Distinctions between Inter and Intragenerational Justice  
The failure of this search is not fatal to the project of providing convincing reasons that we 
are obliged to preserve SCNC; perhaps the methodology of intergenerational justice has failed to 
capture this obligation because it neglects morally relevant characteristics of our relationship with 
future people. Indeed, since Barry’s Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice (1999), 
philosophers have extended theories of spatial distribution to the temporal distribution at the heart 
of intergenerational justice.46 We’ve seen, for instance that preference satisfaction, resources, and 
capabilities—all popular currencies of intragenerational justice—have been grafted on to 
intergenerational concerns. There are good reasons for this: as Barry notes, we have developed 
sophisticated theories and apparati for examining relationships between living individuals, and are 
accustomed to thinking along these lines. Better, to Barry, not to “start from scratch” (43). 
However, there are a number of perennial differences between contemporary and 
intergenerational relations that might warrant reexamination of this methodology.  Furthermore, our 
increasing capacity to produce irreversible environmental change means that there might be 
emergent circumstances of intergenerational justice: fair principles might look very different now 
than they did a hundred years ago. It is worthwhile to examine these circumstances; perhaps existing 
                                                 
46 For instance Page (2007) and Vrousalis (2016). 
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metrics do not include SCNC because they are not designed to adequately consider these distinct 
features of justice between generations.  
First, there are salient differences between our relationships with contemporaries and our 
relationships with future people. Most generally, as highlighted above by the Skeptic, we must note 
that there is no cooperation between those of non-overlapping generations, and, relatedly, current 
people will always wield the exclusive power to set back the interests of future people (Meyer 2016). 
Power relations between contemporaries can shift over time: one’s ability to set back the interests 
of others shifts with the circumstances. In contrast, the current generation holds exclusive, 
unidirectional influence over future generations, to the point where our actions determine the 
identity and number of those who will exist in the future. Future people, on the other hand, have no 
agency to alter the present day situation. More specifically to my project, though, we find that the 
relationship between SCNC and justice is manifested differently in the intergenerational case.  
 
Distributive Ability  
Between intra and intergenerational justice exists a crucial difference in our ability to 
distribute SCNC. We don’t physically allocate or apportion SCNC among contemporaries—objects 
like the Whanganui River or the Grand Canyon are locked in place. Such places are not 
intragenerational primary goods. An injustice has perhaps occurred if one group has differential 
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access to such public resources,47 but we are not concerned with the goods themselves as they, at 
present, exist immovable. The best we can offer is to distribute the access to such things: the means 
to travel to them and the freedom to engage with them.  
In considerations of intergenerational justice, however, objects like SCNC are implicated in 
a different sense. It does seem like we can temporally distribute SCNC. We might say, for instance, 
that if future people no longer have public lands or UNESCO sites48 available to them, that there 
has been an unfair distribution of such places across time. Merely following the methodology of 
intragenerational justice—offering future people the means to access SCNC—is fruitless without 
some distribution of the token resources themselves. Actual physical spaces—while disqualified 
from a theory of spatial justice—are subject to temporal distribution. The possibility for an unjust 
temporal distribution of SCNC is exacerbated by our nascent ability to irreversibly damage and 
destroy such goods, a topic which I will turn to shortly. 
 
Influence 
A further relevant feature of our relationship with posterity, which will be familiar from a 
line of reasoning utilized by the Skeptic, is the fact that, to a greater degree than intragenerational 
justice, our present-day actions form the options and preferences of future people.  We can do so in 
                                                 
47The field of environmental justice tackles the questions surrounding intragenerational distribution, noting extreme 
environmental inequities for minorities and those of lower socioeconomic status. See, for example   
48 Consider the potential ramifications of Donald Trump’s 2017 disavowal of UNESCO.  
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two ways. First, we can entrench certain kinds of preferences in our children and communities: we 
teach people that it is better to play sports than play video games, we embed social norms like ‘I 
desire to recycle,’ and we educate children with the hopes that their preferences will mirror ours, 
that they will continue to value the institutions and practices that have served us well. This shaping 
effect is not unique to intergenerational justice: we can, of course, influence existing people to be 
unaware of their unjust conditions. Our impact, however, is intensified in the intergenerational case.  
  Second, we can influence the preferences of future people in the options we give them to 
prefer. If we do not leave them with the ability to swim in rivers, for instance, they will not develop 
a preference for that activity as their form of recreation. In fact, they might develop a distaste for 
rivers: they are dirty and polluted and often cause flood damage. Future people’s preferences are, in 
this sense, defined by the set of options we leave them to value (Bykvist 2009). Certain 
environmental features and ways of life will not be among the set of options available to future 
people. In all likelihood, this will mean that they do not prefer them, or fight to procure them again: 
we do not add the impossible to our list of potential values or conceptions of the good. The 
adaptability of preferences, then, can be used both in support of the claim that SCNC ought to persist, 
and, as per the Skeptic, to bolster the contention that the resources we leave are fungible.49 
Regardless, it is unique feature of intergenerational justice that ought to shape and constrain what 
fairness towards futurity consists of.   
                                                 




3.4.2 Past Intergenerational Justice vs Current Intergenerational Justice  
In addition to the differences between intra and intergenerational justice that arise as a result 
of the dynamics of time, there are distinctions between the circumstances of intergenerational justice 
over time that warrant scrutiny, emergent factors of our relationship with posterity that ought to be 
explicitly considered in our characterizations of intergenerational justice.   
 
Time and Irreversibility  
Recent science powerfully contends that our inchoate environmental influence risks us 
crossing a number of thresholds that engender irreversible damage to the earth's natural systems 
(Scheffer et al. 2001) (Stern 2007), and the ability to produce such change is an emergent feature of 
intergenerational justice. Climate change is, of course, the most potent example;50 it is now scientific 
fact that we have anthropogenically manipulated our climate such that sea levels will likely rise to 
severely flood existing coastal cities and islands. Irreversible effects are additionally possible 
locally, however: replacing a public park with a mall, damming revered rivers, or uranium mining 
on public lands are instances of irrevocable modification. Such change is already occurring: a 2017 
report in New Zealand from the Prime Minister’s chief scientist suggests that many of New 
                                                 
50While, CC is not of focus in my discussions, it should be noted as a crucial factor limiting the scope of possible 
intergenerational justice models. While the worry persists that not explicitly addressing CC is a broad oversight—and 
that the preservation of SCNC is mere luxury—the urgency of climate change should not, I believe, mean that we 
ignore local and place-specific environmental questions of the kind that I address in this thesis.  
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Zealand’s rivers have reached thresholds where previous high water quality levels may never be 
attainable again (Gudsell 2017). Our ability to irreversibly damage natural systems is new—an 
emergent circumstance of intergenerational justice. 
 Despite a tendency for policy makers to reference ‘irreversible change,’ you would be right 
to ask for a cogent definition of ‘irreversibility.’  Indeed, it does seem that, given enough time, most 
environmental damages are indeed reversible. The Whanganui River can be restored, and if humans 
were to stop emitting carbon today, the climate would eventually stabilize; in this sense nothing is 
irreversible. In contrast, you might note that everything is irreversible. The decision to spend vast 
sums of money on river restoration, for example, will, just like river damage, result in a set of 
circumstances that cannot be altered.  
 Cass Sunstein (2008) is thus correct in noting that there are competing conceptions of 
irreversibility at play in the environmental discourse; whether a particular act is “irreversible” 
depends on how it is characterized.  Economists, for instance, see irreversibility in terms of sunk 
costs: if we wait too long to engage in environmental restoration efforts, the future costs may be 
significantly more expensive. In this sense, it is a loss of money that is irreversible, not the physical 
world itself: even non-renewable resources will likely regenerate along billion-year timescales. On 
the other hand, Sunstein notes that environmentalists deem environmental change as irreversible if 
it is serious (not one tree, but an entire forest), and deals with goods that might be deemed 
“qualitatively unique, without real substitutes” (Sunstein 2008, 16).  
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It is crucial, though, to separate the claim that something can be irreversibly damaged from 
the claim that something is irreplaceable or non-substitutable. We could cause irreversible damage 
to something that is replaceable; consider what seems like irreversible damage to BCNC: turning 
corn fields into low-income housing. To avoid smuggling my conclusion (SCNC is 
intergenerationally non-substitutable) into the claims I use to support it, when I propose that SCNC 
can be irreversibly damaged, such damage does not depend on its non-substitutability. 
 The kind of irreversibility I have in mind, then, references human time scales and 
permanence: SCNC can be irreversibly damaged because some of the effects of our actions seriously 
change such places and the functions51 of such places in ways that cannot be reversed in the space 
of a human life. In this way, irreversibility is not about sunk costs or non-substitutability, but rather 
the fact that we can create substantively different environmental states of affairs that cannot 
practically and effectively be reversed within one generation. This is the case in terms of repairs but 
not development of SCNC: the Whanganui River might take generations to recover from pollution, 
but change in the other direction (dams, diversion), could be enacted in months or years.  
Importantly, as noted by Ekins et al (2003), irreversibility is largely unique to natural 
capital:52 “The destruction of manufactured capital is very rarely irreversible (this would only occur 
                                                 
51See Section 1.4.1. Again, I must allow that much change to natural spaces, while irreversible, may be benign whilst 
still contending that there are thresholds beyond which the functions of SCNC are impaired. 
52Such irreversibility also seems to apply to many pieces of token cultural capital. In fact, much of my argument rings 
true for heritage conservation: the Mona Lisa, for example, can be irreversibly destroyed in a way that other human 
capital such as schools, libraries, and roads cannot.  
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if the human capital, or knowledge, that created the manufactured capital had also been lost), 
whereas irreversibility, with such effects as species extinction, climate change or even the 
combustion of fossil fuels, is common in the consumption of natural capital” (Ekins 2003). Consider, 
for instance, a horrific fire that burns a local library: has anything been irreversibly damaged? Today, 
it is likely that the library would be rebuilt within a matter of years, and the information contained 
in its many books would have been stored elsewhere—we often explicitly engage in efforts to 
prevent the loss of human knowledge through digitization of texts and online repositories. The 
damages to the library are reversible within a single human life. Natural capital, on the other hand, 
cannot be duplicated and stored in a digital warehouse in case the first copy is burned.  
Furthermore, SCNC can also be irreversibly damaged in a manner highlighted by the 
Skeptic. As SCNC becomes physically degraded or destroyed, the centrality and meaning of that 
place for the communities built around it can become permanently damaged or modified. SCNC 
might still feature prominently in the physical space of the community, but the way in which 
individuals interact with the resource will be irreversibly altered. In other words, it need not be the 
case that the Whanganui River no longer exists for us to deem it irreversibly changed: it could lose 
its sociocultural functionality via severe pollution or diversion (Kirsch and Kirsch 2001) (Adger et 





A second nascent feature of our connection with posterity is the expansion of our agency to 
avert the aforementioned environmental degradation. 2017 affords us the technology and knowledge 
to, in a way unlike our predecessors, prevent thresholds from being crossed: we have, at this point, 
undisputable science and environmental management practices detailing how best to preserve 
resources, as well as sophisticated systems to project the effects of our actions. Unpacking these 
recommendations is not a concern of this project; it should suffice to note that, concomitantly with 
the expansion of our potential to irreversibly alter future conditions comes the development of our 
agency to prevent such damage. 
  
‘Progress’ and Intergenerational Justice 
These points highlight that, at least for developed countries, somewhere over the last 50-75 
years, the circumstances of intergenerational justice have changed. For most of human history, an 
altruistic concern for one’s children was sufficient for intergenerational justice to obtain; in fact, it 
looks like up until recently our environmental modifications tended to make things better for 
futurity. As humans as early as 10,000 BC moved from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle to agricultural 
communities, they impacted the environment in a way which markedly improved the lives of future 
people on most metrics. In a more recent example, it seems that we would not want to characterize 
the environmental impacts of Eisenhower’s highway system or more efficient water distribution and 
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as intergenerationally unjust: this infrastructure facilitated mass transportation, an increase in the 
availability of clean water and a decline in disease. These massive, intergenerational projects were 
motivated by both self-interested and future-oriented concerns, driven by natural altruism for the 
future and an eye towards progress. And they worked: much of our environmental modification 
throughout the course of history improved future condition. What humans 100 years ago wanted for 
themselves (better water infrastructure) was tightly linked with the interests of future people; regard 
for improving the lives of one’s self and children was enough to secure an intergenerationally just 
state of affairs.  
There is an inflection point—probably around the mid to late 1900’s, however, where it 
seems a natural concern for one's progeny and a commitment to ‘progress’ ceased to be in service 
of justice between generations. As many have pointed out, human progress and growth are 
physically constrained by natural limits (McGinnis et al. 1973).  Consider, for instance, the recent 
proposal to open the Antarctic Wildlife refuge for continued oil drilling: this might, of course, 
provide short-term economic resilience to the people of Alaska, whose government allots (shrinking) 
oil dividends to citizens from the ‘Alaska Permanent Fund.’ This development, framed in terms of 
intergenerational equity in the form of economic provisions for future generations of Alaskans, may 
undermine other metrics of intergenerational unfairness such access to unique and distinct natural 
spaces or, for native Alaskans, the ability to participate in a specific way of life.  
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The point, then, is this: we have always had a concern for the future, a regard for posterity 
that is difficult to conceptually separate from self-interest; we are personally vested in envisioning 
the success of our children. Acting in line with this type of orientation—with regard to both SCNC 
and other intergenerational concerns—was, for most of human history, was enough to fulfil our 
intergenerational obligations. Now, however, with our longer scale temporal influence, the 
circumstances of intergenerational justice have transformed. Environmental damage in the name of 
human progress, motivated by a concern for our children and grandchildren, might result in a 
profoundly unfair situation: improvements in the lives of our children may not be in service of long 
term fairness between generations. 
Here then, we have a response to the Skeptic’s complaint that we ought not blame ourselves 
for the kind of actions we’ve historically endorsed, for past people did not stand in the same relation 
to us as we stand to people in the future. Acting in an intergenerationally just fashion, for past people, 
fell naturally from benevolent concerns for their progeny. Now, however, the conditions of 
intergenerational justice have transformed: we can produce irreversible environmental change on 
long-term time scales, and we have enough scientific information to predict the effects of these kinds 
of actions. A benevolent concern for SCNC is not enough, for instance, to ensure it continues to 
exist. Each generation could engage in justifiable (to their children) conversion of natural to human 
capital at a rate which is unsustainable in the long term, engendering long-term intergenerational 
inequality. In other words, while two neighboring generations might share roughly similar 
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conditions, a wide-angle view will reveal a wide disparity. In light of these conditions, a critical 
examine of the metric of intergenerational justice is in order. 
These emergent circumstances of intergenerational justice demand an answer to the metric 
question that does not simply extend the currencies of intragenerational justice. It is to this task I 
turn next. Before moving to Chapter IV, however, let’s review where we’ve been thus far. In my 
introduction, I introduced a common intuition: we are obligated to preserve specific physical things 
for future generations, objects ineligible for substitution or compensation. In Chapter I, I unpacked 
this concept of substitutability, which is featured prominently in the literature on sustainability. In 
thinking about what aspects of the natural world we are obligated to save, we can distinguish 
between BCNC and SCNC, noting that SCNC is manifested in token natural spaces which are more 
than technologically non-substitutable. In Chapter II, I outlined the claims of my opponent, who 
might maintain the impossibility of intergenerational justice generally or be more specifically 
skeptical that SCNC is the kind of thing we have a duty to protect. In Chapter III, I examined 
contemporary accounts of intergenerational justice in an attempt to find justification for the place of 
SCNC. I came up short; the resources of current currencies of intergenerational justice pay little 
mind to places like the Whanganui River. I suggested a few features of intergenerational justice —
both persistent and emergent—that demand we reconsider whether extending metrics of justice 
between contemporaries is an appropriate methodology. Perhaps, given careful reflection on these 
circumstances, we would include SCNC within the evaluative space of intergenerational justice.  
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 I’d like, them, to offer a direct defense of the place on non-substitutability in our metric of 
intergenerational equity. In order to maintain that SCNC is a non-substitutable component of a just 
endowment, I must defend the claim that there is, in fact, something manifestly unfair about 
irreversibly denying future people access to such goods. Due to the constructed nature of the non-
substitutability of SCNC discussed in Part I, we cannot rely on current characterizations of human 
well-being—in which SCNC is often a necessary feature—to argue future people are owed such 
goods: those future citizens might easily adapt to a world void of the places we value now.  Are 
there any further reasons for mandating SCNC as an object of intergenerational justice that are 
immune to the worries of the Skeptic? In the following chapter, I employ the work of John Rawls 






DEFENDING SCNC AS NON-SUBSTITUTABLE 
 
In Chapter III, I searched for a characterization of intergenerational justice that could adequately 
protect places like the Whanganui River.  Current currencies of what we owe the future—preference 
satisfaction, resources, or capabilities—do not, on their own terms, demand the preservation of 
SCNC. There are, however, additional reasons that such value-laden spaces ought to persist.  I will 
survey three prevailing approaches, which justify natural preservation by noting that nature is 
intrinsically valuable, transformative, or a necessary component of a good life. Can any of these 
natural values account for the intergenerational non-substitutability of SCNC in a way that can 
respond to the Skeptic’s more stubborn claims? In this chapter I will first claim that, while such 
arguments submit compelling explanations as to why the Whanganui River might be an object of 
moral concern, they are not the kind of reasons that secure these valuable natural spaces as a 
component of justice particularly. I suggest, then, a fourth approach. Using Rawlsian tools in an 
effort to respond to the Skeptic’s remaining worries, I argue—without relying on the three 
previously mentioned justifications—that SCNC is indeed a non-substitutable feature of 
intergenerational justice. In brief summary, the persistence of SCNC is a necessary condition upon 
leaving a robust set of options—including the opportunity to participate in projects of 
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intergenerational significance—for future people, and is furthermore a principle which accords with 
a commitment to intergenerational neutrality.   
 
4.1 The Intrinsic Value Argument 
A standard argument for environmental preservation, featured heavily in much of the 
environmental ethics literature, makes appeals to nature’s intrinsic value. I examine a few varieties 
of intrinsic value arguments below, focusing on positions that apply intrinsic value to non-sentient 
aspects of the environment, since indeed it is the persistence of such spaces that is my central 
concern. In inspecting these claims it becomes clear that they do not provide convincing reasons that 
intergenerational justice requires reference to SCNC.  
Generally, defenders of environmental intrinsic value argue nature is valuable above and 
beyond its usefulness (instrumental value) for human beings.  One variety of intrinsic value views, 
for instance, situates moral considerability in individual aspects of nature. Paul Taylor (1981) offers 
a ‘life centric’ account: regardless of consciousness or the ability to feel pain, Taylor argues that 
aspects of the natural world acquire value insofar as they are as alive and have ends of their own. 
Appealing to the common propensity to value and fight for life, Taylor situates individual living 
things as the ultimate center of moral concern: even if a tree or a bug cannot think or feel, Taylor 
suggests they are valuable since they have identifiable goals or telos. If having such a telos is the 
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requirement for moral considerability, nature qualifies as valuable above and beyond its use in 
fulfilling human ends.  
 In another account, Holmes Rolston (1998) offers a further departure from anthropocentrism 
by rejecting an anthropogenic system and arguing that value exists entirely independent of conscious 
human valuers.  Rolston contends that the moral considerability of nature is a mind-independent 
natural fact resulting from what is evolutionarily ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for organisms, regardless of 
whether such organisms realize it or not. Rejecting that of humans are the ultimate source of value, 
Rolston proposes a kind of naturalism in which evolution and natural selection are the basis for 
observer-independent natural value, citing a number of organisms or life-sustaining characteristics 
which he feels generate value in themselves.  Dragonflies, for example, have “highly engineered 
wings” which actually change shape with airflow, despite a lack of muscles.  Regardless of the 
presence of a valuer, it seems that organisms, specific to their particular kind, have characteristics 
which promote their individual good, and it is in this way that nature’s human-independent value is 
introduced into the world (Rolston 2016, 77). 
An alternate strain of thought rejects the idea that value exists in individual entities and 
instead proposes a holistic ethic in which collectives, species, or ecosystems are the locus of moral 
concern. The face of this holism is Aldo Leopold, whose seminal ‘Land Ethic’ roots value in the 
community or land as a whole. His position is summarized by the oft-quoted “A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
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tends otherwise” (Leopold 1949, 249). While Leopold’s ethic is largely an emotional, rhetorical 
appeal to why we should see ourselves as members of a larger ecosystem, J. Baird Callicott (1991) 
proposes that there are indeed strong philosophical foundations, rooted in Smithian ‘moral 
sentiments,’ from which to argue for a holistic ethic, and claims that we must conceive of ourselves 
as community members rather than conquerors. This ‘organic whole’ model does not mean than 
individuals are not valuable, but merely suggests that their value is conceived of alongside the whole 
ecosystem, thus opening up space for nature’s non-instrumental value alongside its usefulness.  
The fundamental idea throughout these arguments—that the natural world is an end in 
itself—does not fit neatly into my discussion of what, exactly, ought to be included in the basket of 
goods we leave for the future. First, the project of ascribing intrinsic value to nature largely rejects 
the anthropocentrism inherent in my discussion of justice between present and future human 
generations. Second, even if we successfully defend the claim that SCNC exhibits intrinsic value, 
such arguments do not do much explanatory work to show why future people’s lack of access to 
such things constitutes an injustice. Defenders of intrinsic value are concerned not with the question 
of justice, but with the question of moral considerability. Given the general agreement that 
something with intrinsic value warrants moral concern, if the environment indeed has such value we 
are required treat it as such. This view might mandate that we are ethically obligated to preserve 
natural spaces, just as we are ethically obligated to preserve (i.e.: not kill) other archetypes of 
intrinsic value such as human beings. Arguments for intrinsic value, however, are not designed to 
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reckon with justice relations: even if SCNC has intrinsic value, it does not follow that it is an injustice 
if future people are denied it. All that has been secured is that SCNC—along with other aspects of 
nature—ought to be included within our sphere of moral concern.  
This last point gives rise to an additional objection regarding utilizing intrinsic value as a 
justification for the preservation of places like the Whanganui River. Recall my central claim in 
Chapter I: the non-substitutability of some token natural spaces is a result of their construction as 
such by specific communities. Theories of intrinsic value are unable to speak to token places of 
importance—a blanket ascription of such value does not square with the fact that the Whanganui 
River is an example of SCNC whereas some other landscape might not be. Intrinsic value, in other 
words, offers no help as we deliberate about what aspects of the world ought to exist for the benefit 
of humans, for its primary goal is to argue that nature, in fact, does not exist for that purpose.  
Finally, as the contentious nature of intrinsic value debates highlights, nature having such 
value is not of universal appeal.53 A worldview strictly wedded to the non-anthropocentric value of 
the environment is rooted in a particularly ‘green’ conception of the good. As the Skeptic has 
highlighted, in the face of uncertainty regarding the preferences of future people, our reasons for 
incorporating SCNC within the bounds of justice ought to be available to all. Intrinsic value does 
not fulfil this criteria, and thus does not provide a response which will satisfy the Skeptic.  
                                                 




4.2 The Transformative Value Argument   
A separate but related strategy to argue for natural preservation is grounded in the 
transformative power of nature. This explanation differs from the intrinsic value approach in its 
explicit reference to nature’s effect on humans, yet still lacks the resources to fully defend the claim 
that the destruction of SCNC is an intergenerational injustice. The general skeleton of the argument 
appeals to the way in which experiences in nature transform our worldly understanding: we ought 
to care about preserving nature because it has the power to change the way we think and feel. In the 
conclusion of his famous account of Katahdin, Maine’s highest mountain, Thoreau is the archetypal 
spokesperson for the sublimity and transformative potential of nature:  “Talk of mysteries!” he says. 
“Think of our life in nature,—daily to be shown matter, to come in contact with it,—rocks, trees, 
wind on our cheeks! The solid earth! The actual world! The common sense! Contact! Contact! Who 
are we? Where are we?” (Thoreau 1864). This kind of meaningful reflection brought on by the 
exposed Maine ridgelines speaks to some important natural values that ought to be maintained: put 
in simple syllogism, nature can transform us, these transformations are valuable, and valuable things 
ought to be preserved. 
However, the argument from transformative power has trouble defending the significance of 
particular value-laden places within a theory of intergenerational justice. First, places that seem 
deemed transformative are of a different kind than the SCNC I wish to defend in this thesis. 
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Thoreau’s experience on Katahdin owes part of its power to his encounter with a new place; his 
interaction with the mountain was far from everyday. In another example, environmental 
philosopher David Abram, on a trip to Bali, had a transformative moment with a mystical spider 
web as he weathered a storm from within a dim cave. “It was from them” he says,  
That I first learned of  the intelligence that lurks in nonhuman nature, the ability that an alien 
form of sentience has to echo one’s own, to instill a reverberation in oneself that temporarily 
shatters habitual ways of seeing and feeling, leaving one open to a world all alive, awake, 
and aware (Abram 1996, 17).  
 
Garden variety spiders or the webs in the corners of closets, it seems, were not sufficient for this 
realization. Similarly, it is the everyday environment that I am interested in: the Whanganui River 
does not give rise to profound singular experiences, rather it is valuable because of long term, 
constant, and quotidian engagement. Using the transformative power of nature in the broad sense as 
grounds for the non-substitutability of SCNC defends such places on the basis of a kind of value 
that is not central to their worth. 
Relatedly, an argument founded upon transformative power encounters a ‘boundary 
problem’ as noted by Sakar (2012, 57). It is not clear the features of a natural object that give rise to 
transformative experience: what, exactly, is shared between Katahdin’s exposure and the simple 
lines of a spider’s web? Even a blade of grass might elicit transformation (57). How are we to use 
the transformative power of nature to deliberate about where, exactly, to focus our environmental 
efforts? The problem of delineating specific non-substitutable spaces is still potent, and perhaps 
becomes even more so if we chose to use transformative power as a litmus test for non-
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substitutability—at least spaces like the Whanganui River exhibit non-substitutability for a group or 
community who can reveal their interests. The spider’s web, on the other hand, was perhaps 
transformative for a singular instance for Abrams alone.  
Second, the transformative power of nature is, like intrinsic value, conceptually divorced 
from the issue of justice. It is not clear, exactly, what the relationship is between this kind of natural 
value and justice between contemporaries, let alone the temporal dimension. We don’t talk about 
transformative experiences—or access to them—as being the kind of thing subject to distribution; 
in fact, part of the importance of these moments lies in their unpredictability: Thoreau did not climb 
the Knife’s edge in explicit search of the sublime. While I am in no doubt as to the metamorphic 
potential of exposed ridges, grounding a mandatory requirement to preserve SCNC with an 
argument that future people ought to have access to the transformative power of nature does not 
provide justification for SCNC specifically, nor offer any comment as to why the transformative 
potential of nature cannot be substituted with other kinds of transformative experiences—education, 
for instance.  Rather, it demands the preservation of some generalized environmental conditions 
which might, if future people are in the right place at the right time, facilitate transformation. Once 
again, we find that this kind of value in nature is not sufficient justification that SCNC a required 




4.3 The Nature as Necessary Argument   
A third explanation for environmental preservation posits that a connection to or appreciation 
of the natural world is a necessary or universal condition of a flourishing life. In the words of Barry 
(1999): “Perhaps people in the future might learn to find satisfaction in totally artificial landscapes, 
walking on the astroturf amid the plastic trees while the electronic birds sing overhead. But we 
cannot but believe that something horrible would have happened to human beings if they did not 
miss real grass, trees, and birds”(49). Brian Norton (2005) suggests a similar case:  
Suppose our generation systematically converts all old-growth forests and wilderness areas 
to productive uses such as farming and mining, producing wealth but making it impossible 
for future persons to experience unspoiled wilderness or other natural places...As long as 
they have adequate income to be able to afford such substitutes, the economists tell us, they 
will have been adequately compensated for the unavailability of such places in reality (327). 
 
Both theorists—along with many others—employ an intuitive disgust at this future world as a 
premise in their arguments for non-substitutability.  
Couched in these brief thought experiments is a normative claim about what makes a good 
life: in the eyes of Barry and Norton, nature is a necessary component. These commentators maintain 
that access to non-artificial old growth forests unequivocally makes life better. Support for this claim 
abounds: recent research suggests that time spent outdoors provides a wide array of social, physical, 
and cognitive benefits (Bowler et al. 2010). Even the presence of a small indoor plant in hospital 
settings may increase the wellbeing of the ill (Bringslimark, Patil, and Hartig 2008). 
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However, these facts and the associated claim that we require nature for wellbeing are not 
helpful in my response to the Skeptic. First, while contending that nature is necessary for wellbeing 
may well bolster an argument that SCNC is a required component of the basket of goods we are 
required to leave, this approach once again provides little help in justifying that token natural 
features of the world—the Whanganui River—ought to persist. Even if it is true that access an 
indiscriminate nature is necessary for robust wellbeing—a claim brought into question by the 
aforementioned ‘Environmentalist’s Paradox’—we have not satisfactorily argued that some specific 
SCNC is a non-substitutable component of what we owe the future. Access to some indiscriminate 
nature might be an inarguable source of human wellbeing, but a hydrangea plant might be just as 
good as a lavender plant, and the Whanganui River could be substituted with a serene pond.  
Second, this argument, despite gesturing at the universal value of a life lived in harmony 
with the natural world, is, like the previous suggestions, particularly rooted in a specific conception 
of the good life. While BCNC might be non-substitutable insofar as it secures the basic conditions 
for human existence, SCNC, as we’ve seen, is required for some particular chosen pursuits, projects, 
and ways of living. As I search, in light of the Skeptic’s paternalistic worries, for a justification of 
the importance of SCNC that is neutral among competing conceptions of the good and acknowledges 
the human potential for adaptation, I cannot argue on the grounds that SCNC is the kind of thing 
that unequivocally makes life go better—a primary good.  I will not maintain, for instance, that the 
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city dweller would be better if they had a deeper sense of environmental place, and I hope that my 
argument will appeal to even the ardent urbanite, who, in no uncertain terms, “hates the outdoors.” 
Clearly, I am unsatisfied with relying on what might be termed “the environmentalist’s 
intuition”—the view that the sacredness and specialness of nature is adequate grounds for making 
the preservation of things like SCNC a necessary component of our intergenerational obligation.   
The environmentalist’s intuition is simply not strong enough to respond to the Skeptic, for it is 
possible that human wellbeing is not dependent on unspoiled wilderness, believable that we might 
even flourish in artificial landscapes or a Disney facsimile. In Rawlsian fashion, it seems that as we 
deliberate about what constitutes an intergenerational injustice, we must utilize reasons that are 
accessible to all citizens: the of addition of future people, whose preferences and values are largely 
shaped by our choices, makes a commitment to neutral justification especially salient.  
Before moving on I should note, first, that turning to Rawls and the tradition of liberalism 
could prompt some serious objections, especially insofar as I am concerned with indigenous peoples 
whose worldview may not be adequately accommodated by the supposed neutrality and universal 
desirability of liberal principles. There are good reasons to suppose that liberal values play a role in 
forming the context in which both colonialism (Pieterse and Parekh 1995) and our current 
environmental crises (De-Shalit 2000) have played out. I am sensitive to these claims and hope that, 
in presenting reasons why self-interested parties might opt to preserve SCNC, I can accommodate 
some of the perspectives that may have previously been disempowered by the approach to justice 
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advocated by liberal theorists. As such, while I endorse the liberal commitment to neutrality I do not 
agree that current answers to the metric of intergenerational justice, delineated in Chapter III, present 
a neutral conception of what we ought to save.  
 
4.4 A Rawlsian Defense of SCNC  
At this point, it should be clear that I place neutrality among conceptions of the good as one 
crucial desiderata in our formulations of intergenerational justice. Of course, neutrality itself is a 
contested concept,54 but a neutral vindication of the place of SCNC is immune to the worries of the 
Skeptic: it is not rooted in a current preference for SCNC, nor does it illegitimately import such 
desires onto future people. It is only fitting then, that I turn next to the hypothetical contract theory 
of John Rawls, whose archetypal work on justice is strongly committed to neutrality. There are, of 
course, alternative frameworks, even within the liberal tradition, from which to consider justice 
relations, but Rawls’ tools of the veil of ignorance and original position provide the means to 
appraise our intergenerational duties free from generational bias or reliance on the 
‘environmentalist’s intuition’ My purpose here is not a critique of Rawls or a contribution to 
interpretations of his work, rather his hypothetical contractual situation provides a vehicle to 
assemble and arrange our intergenerational intuitions.55 As such, I do not press Rawls, aside from 
                                                 
54See Arneson (2004) for a summary of competing views.  
55 Vanderheiden (2008) offers a thoughtful overview of the shortcomings of Rawls’ treatment of intergenerational 
justice. See Chapter 5.  
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clarifying some equivocations in his view, on the terms and conditions of the OP—the mechanism 
for deriving principles of intergenerational justice.   
Instead, I put pressure on the principles of fairness that Rawls suggests are mutually 
agreeable from behind the veil of ignorance.  The skeleton of my argument, to anticipate, is as 
follows: I claim that, if the self-interested parties reasoning in the original position are privy to the 
emergent circumstances of intergenerational justice elucidated in the previous chapter, SCNC 
emerges as a necessary feature of true intergenerational equality—regardless of whether one 
endorses the intrinsic or transformative value of nature or the environmentalist’s intuition. As our 
deliberators aim to decide upon a robust set of guiding intergenerational principles, they will 
discover that SCNC is a non-substitutable factor to be considered within the evaluative metric of 
intergenerational justice. If these arguments convince, we will have good reasons to incorporate 
SCNC as a non-substitutable component in the basket of goods to be intergenerationally distributed.   
 
4.4.1 Rawls on Justice  
First, a brief explanation of Rawls’ view is in order. Put simply, Rawls seeks to understand 
how a society can function coherently given fundamental differences in comprehensive views and 
conceptions of the good. Each individual has competing goals, ideologies, ways of living, and 
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understandings of morality, (disagreeing, for instance, about the value of nature),56 but we must 
nevertheless find a starting point that can provide a basis for a shared conception of justice; the 
diversity of human experience makes a political system based upon acceptance of one 
comprehensive view unfeasible (Rawls 1994, 36–57). In other words, it is not legitimate to derive 
policies from a contested conception of what is good or right, and “our exercise of political power 
is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions—
were we to state them as government officials—are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that 
other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons” (Rawls 1997, 771). Like justice between 
contemporaries, intergenerational justice must too adhere to these standards. ‘Other citizens,’ then, 
includes those who will live in the future: we must be able to provide cogent reasons, acceptable by 
future generations, for our intergenerational principles.  
We come then to Rawls’ idea of ‘public reason,’ which posits that all laws (or, for my 
purposes, intergenerational principles) must also be justified by or at least consistent with public 
(secular) reasons, which do not require a specific worldview to endorse and understand. I take the 
previous three justifications for natural preservation to be features of a comprehensive conception 
of the good, and therefore disqualified from being the kind of reason that could determine 
obligations of justice. I see no reason why a commitment to public reason would not extend to 
                                                 
56Rawls is largely silent on environmental value, stating in Political Liberalism that “Many if not most political 
questions do not concern those fundamental matters, for example, much tax legislation and many laws regulating 
property; statutes protecting the environment and controlling pollution; establishing national parks and preserving 
wilderness areas and animal and plant species; and laying aside funds for museums and the arts” (214).  
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intergenerational justice: a certain conception or mode of valuing the natural world cannot, then 
serve as a justification for the intergenerational importance of SCNC.  
In order to arrive at a conception of justice which could theoretically be agreed upon by all 
members of society, Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), employs a thought experiment where 
citizens who are forming a society must agree upon fair principles. To arrive at a final determination, 
citizens adopt the hypothetical perspective of the ‘original position,’ behind the ‘veil of ignorance.’ 
What this means is that deliberators, while they are characterized as free and equal, know nothing 
about who they are or what role they operate in society. They understand certain aspects of what it’s 
like to be human, alongside biological, psychological, economic, and ecological facts about the 
world, but are ‘veiled’ from any of their own characteristics or even any restricted view of the human 
good. This is not supposed to be a description of an actual contractual situation, but rather a thought 
experiment designed to capture the proper perspective for deciding on shared principles of social 
cooperation. What Rawls argues here is that, given this lack of personal characteristics, we arrive at 
a fair conception of justice which every citizen can endorse regardless of their status in society, 
independent goals, or underlying religious/political doctrines.  
There is much more to be said about Rawls, and I will not discuss here the principles for 
justice between contemporaries that Rawls derives from the original position. However, it is 
important to note what Rawls sees as the ‘metric’ of justice: that which hypothetical contractors 
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know is universally valuable to all people and subject to distribution. Rawls calls these things 
‘primary goods.’ They are: 
(1) basic rights and liberties [...]; 
(2) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of 
diverse opportunities; 
(3) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in 
the political and economic institutions of the basic structure; 
(4) income and wealth; and finally, 
(5) the social bases of self-respect: the recognition by social institutions that gives citizens a 
sense of self-worth and the confidence to carry out their plans (Rawls 1994, 181). 
 
This list, to Rawls, details the set of things which all people—conceptions of the good aside— have 
interests in obtaining. Primary goods, which can be likened to the ‘resourcist’ view of metric from 
Section 3.2, are, to Rawls, the evaluative measure of equality: to gauge whether justice obtains, one 
can examine the distribution of these goods among people.  
Important to remember, however, is that Rawls principally designates these goods as the 
currency of justice between contemporaries; they are not specifically designed for the special 
circumstances—both enduring and emerging—of intergenerational justice. Further, Rawls does not 
maintain that these goods should be distributed throughout time in the same way they are distributed 
among contemporaries. As we shall see, revisions are in order.  
 
4.4.2 Rawls on Intergenerational Justice  
Most of the previous discussion has highlighted features of Rawls’ understanding of justice 
between contemporaries, but Rawls, who is not known for giving a particularly comprehensive 
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theory of intergenerational justice (Paden 1997a, 1), does employ a modified version of the OP to 
determine intergenerational principles as well.  Rawls revised the terms of the OP over the course 
of his career, rejecting his initial ‘general assembly’ version—in which there is a representative from 
each generation—in favor of a ‘present time of entry’ condition (Rawls 1971, 254). Under the newer 
formulation, parties in the OP know that they are contemporaries, but they are blind to what 
generation they belong to.  
In a further modification, Rawls (1971) originally stipulates a ‘motivational assumption,’ 
(255) where the hypothetical contractors are inspired to save for those in the following two 
generations, but he subsequently retracts this claim, preferring to retain the self-interested 
deliberators that are characteristic of his work (Rawls 1978).  He settles, then upon the following 
condition:  
The correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all 
generations) would adopt as the one their generation is to follow and as the principle they 
would want preceding generations to have followed (and later generations to follow), no 
matter how far back (or forward) in time. (Rawls 1978, 58) 
 
Thus, the parties in the OP do not know where they will fall on time’s arrow, so one crucial 
requirement for a principle is that it does not disadvantage being born at a later or earlier date. 
Moving forward, I will call this the intergenerational condition.  
Deliberators in the OP must, given these constraints, determine the content of the correct 
principles—one feature of which being the metric used to evaluate whether differing 
intergenerational conditions are just. The theory that emerges must not be so permissive that being 
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born later results in disadvantage, nor too conservative is that it over demanding, requiring 
unjustifiable sacrifice on the part of earlier generations to fund the trivial pursuits of their progeny. 
As emphasized, it must also be neutral with regard to comprehensive conceptions of the good: the 
deliberators do not know which generation they belong to, nor what preferences they will have when 
they arrive.  
Rawls claims that self-interested contractors would adopt a broadly sufficientarian, two-
stage approach to intergenerational justice, a ‘just savings principle’ that is mutually agreeable and 
fair with respect to the intergenerational condition. In the first ‘accumulation’ stage, a generation is 
required to positively save—that is, to set aside more for future generations than they received—in 
order to build the stock of resources necessary for just institutions. Once such institutions are 
developed we enter the ‘steady-state’ phase: the savings rate—in Rawls’ scheme—can drop to zero. 
This does not mean that we have no obligations whatsoever with regard to the future; rather, we are 
simply not required to save anything additional to that which we received, that which is necessary 
to preserve the basic structure of society. We must continue to  “preserve the gains of culture and 
civilization,” “maintain intact those just institutions that have been established” and “put aside in 
each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation,”(Rawls 1971, 285) but Rawls 
does not argue any specific BCNC or SCNC must necessarily be included. Notably, Rawls is 
concerned here with the goods we produce together, rather than our two varieties of CNC, which 
are goods that we’ve saved together.  
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Rawls explicitly endorses substitutability here: there are no objects of our intergenerational 
duties. Rather, once just institutions are established, “real saving (that is, net additions to real capital) 
may fall to zero; and existing stock only needs to be maintained, or replaced" (Rawls 2001, page 
107, my emphasis). Under this scheme, we pass the litmus test of intergenerational justice so long 
as “existing stock,” is substituted with some other form of capital—regardless of the sociocultural 
value of the places destroyed.  
Importantly, then, Rawls does not even go so far as to be concerned with equal distribution 
of primary goods over time, but rather with acting such that future generations have sufficient 
resources to uphold liberal institutions.57 The cornerstone of intergenerational justice, for Rawls, is 
preserving that which is required for fairness between contemporaries. An injustice occurs, in this 
arrangement, if one generation cannot maintain the basic structure of society due to the actions of 
its predecessors. Priority is on equality between those who will live at the same time: Rawls does 
not as explicitly speak to what fairness between generations would look like. He is correct in 
allowing that our just institutions look very different from generation to generation. When viewed 
side by side, however—from the impartial perspective of the OP—the generational manifestations 
of intragenerationally just institutions might still be an example of profound intergenerational 
                                                 
57Rawls does not think that the difference principle applies to intergenerational concerns (Paden 1997a).This seems 
fitting: there is no way to transfer resources to past generations, who have likely fared worse. Despite the 




inequality. It looks like what the hypothetical contractors would endorse in the OP is far different 
from a mere principle of ‘just savings.’  
 
Clarifying the Intergenerational Original Position  
As I move to a more thoroughgoing examination of what our hypothetical contractors would 
adopt in the OP, we must first clarify a few ambiguities present in Rawls's approach. First, Rawls is 
not always clear as to whether we can actually assume that the past has saved for us.  In A Theory 
of Justice, Rawls posits that, once the VOI is dropped, “past generations have saved or they have 
not" (292).  As many commentators have noted, this undermines the possibility that rational choosers 
would decide to save anything at all: in a kind of ‘intergenerational prisoner’s dilemma’ (Gardiner 
et al. 2010, 96), deliberators would have no self-interested reasons to act favorably towards futurity. 
If their choice of policy in the original position has no effect on the conditions they inherit, it is not 
in their interest to adopt a principle of savings.  
This worry can be sidestepped by highlighting the difference between ideal and non-ideal 
theory. As Jane English notes, Rawls’ aforementioned commitment should be reneged in favor of 
an ‘ideal theory’ version:  
Rawls’ account of just savings is part of an ideal theory, the choosers in the original position 
should assume that other generations save according to just principles, too. [Thus]...selecting 




If determining the principles of intergenerational justice is conducted at the level of ideal theory—
where deliberators can assume that previous generations will have complied with the rules that they 
pick—it becomes prudent to adopt a principle of savings such that no generation accrues 
disadvantage.58  
The principles decided upon, then, should be universally applicable across generations, yet 
robust enough to accommodate the emergent circumstances of intergenerational justice. If one is 
born in 1800, for instance, certain intergenerational maxims decided upon in the intergenerational 
original position might not apply. Or, perhaps more fittingly, we fulfil such duties without active 
effort: as noted in Section 3.4.2 our natural care for our children might have previously been 
sufficient to secure the persistence of SCNC. Since hypothetical contractors have been aware of the 
conditions of our modern Anthropocene (but do not know whether they will end up living in it), they 
will be motivated to come to conclusions that offer guidance for action in our contemporary moment. 
 
4.4.3 What would Deliberators Pick in the Intergenerational OP?  
Rawls is clear that we should be willing to revise our principles of justice in light of new 
circumstances—what hypothetical contractors might endorse will shift in light of new information 
                                                 
58 English’s argument has been criticized by Roger Paden (1997b, 40); however his central complaint is that the 
transition to ideal theory undermines the purpose of the just savings: to create and maintain just institutions. 
Moving forward, though, I follow English, for my purpose in employing Rawls is not so much to examine our 
obligations to ensure and create just institutions, but rather to appraise our intuitions regarding what, exactly, we 
should specify as the appropriate ‘metric’ of intergenerational concern, and to enquire as to the place of SCNC within 
that metric.  
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(Daniels 2003, 2.2). As noted, I propose, then, that parties in the OP ought to be furnished with the 
emergent intergenerational information discussed in Section 3.4: it is reasonable to suggest that our 
hypothetical contractors might be made aware of their ability—and the ability of their potential 
predecessors—to irreversibly destroy natural capital, alongside the scientific knowledge of how best 
to preserve it. Furthermore, under the terms of the OP, deliberators will also be educated in basic 
human psychology, and thus aware of some of the insights of the Skeptic. They will know, for 
instance, that once they leave the OP, our exceptional ability to adapt to the environmental 
circumstances might result in the same self-reported levels of wellbeing as previous generations 
despite a decline in environmental conditions. They are also aware that a world without SCNC is 
compatible with the existence of just institutions that provide BCNC, but, if born at a late enough 
date, we will have the requisite knowledge to preserve value-laden natural capital.  In the same vein, 
the hypothetical contractors will remember that SCNC can be temporally but not spatially 
distributed. Upon comparing generations decades apart, the intergenerational allocation of SCNC 
might—depending on the principles picked—come to light as patently unfair. 
Let’s more carefully consider, then, what parties in the OP could mutually agree upon as fair 
intergenerational conditions.  Recall Rawls' formulation for the correct principle: We should pick 
rules that we would endorse under the assumption that previous generations would have followed 
the same rules. Under these constraints, our hypothetical contractors would come to three pivotal, 
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connected conclusions regarding SCNC that would mandate it as a non-substitutable feature in the 
metric of intergenerational justice.  
 
Preservation of Options 
The first insight would be to note that just savings is compatible with a severe imbalance in 
the number and quality of options available to those of different generations. Disinterested parties—
unaware of whether SCNC will feature prominently in their lives—can no doubt recognize that such 
resources are necessary for a number of different freedoms, a number of place-specific realizations 
of the good life. Such is the case with my central example of the Whanganui River; for generations 
this waterway has been foundational in the flourishing lives of Whanganui Iwi and other New 
Zealanders. In their negotiations, our set of hypothetical contractors will realize that, if they are born 
in a later generation, the set of freedoms they have available to them, despite their access to adequate 
material base, could be paltry compared to the robust set afforded to prior generations: it is possible 
that swimming, fishing for eels, boating, as well as the opportunity to participate an intergenerational 
cultural and spiritual community will be threatened.   
The unfairness of neglecting SCNC can be demonstrated simply: imagine, for instance, that 
we leave a very literal ‘basket’ of goods to each generation.59 To pass intergenerational muster, we 
might require that the basket of goods brings about the same amount of welfare (preferentialism), 
                                                 
59This example is inspired by a similar discussion in Barry (1989).  
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weighs the same (resourcism), or provides a similar number of capabilities that are valued to the 
receiver (capabilitarianism). What, though, of the content of this endowment? We received a basket 
full of a diverse set of goods: apples, oranges, chips, and chocolate. What we pass on, under a 
principle which endorses substitution, need not retain such diversity; we would be licensed in 
leaving an equally weighted basket full of only different varieties of apples. Those on the receiving 
end of the apples may not be aware of the set of options denied from them (after all, they’ve never 
tasted chocolate), but from the OP this arrangement presents as unequivocally unfair—especially 
given our relative power to prevent such a decline in variety. Since the destruction or substitution of 
that SCNC not required for just institutions is sanctioned under any of the currencies of justice from 
Chapter III, people born far in the future can be born into a world void of the specific options 
presented by distinct physical conditions.  
The preservation of options over time has often been noted, in varying forms, as a potential 
maxim of intergenerational justice. Edith Weiss Brown, for instance, says:  
First, each generation must conserve options. This means conserving the diversity of the 
natural and cultural resource base, so that each generation does not unduly restrict the options 
available to future generations in solving their problems and satisfying their own values 
(Weiss 1990, 22). 
 
Amartya Sen in his later work likewise posits that we should be “concerned with preserving – and 
where possible expanding – the substantive freedoms of people today without compromising the 
ability of future generations to have similar, or more, freedoms” (Sen 2004, 1). Talbot Page (1982) 
makes a comparable claim:  
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With some effort we can control the form of the heritage to be passed on to the next 
generation. It is beyond the control of the present generation to ensure that the next one will 
be happy or hard working. It is beyond our control to increase their welfare; we can only 
assure them of certain opportunities for happiness that we can foresee will be essential (32). 
 
Brian Barry (1989), likewise contends that intergenerational justice consists of “some notion of 
equal opportunity across generations” (104).  
What is not routinely illustrated, however, is the fact that SCNC plays a non-substitutable 
role in the maintenance of such options, and therefore, as the hypothetical contractors will realize, 
ought to be an explicit component of the metric of intergenerational justice. Andrew Dobson 
highlights this point, noting that: 
[Liberals] should be in favor of strong sustainability—and not because of any special 
‘commitment’ to nature, but because a structured bequest package amounts to a wide range 
of options from which to choose good lives (Dobson 2003, 158). 
 
In other words, anthropogenic irreversible natural change to SCNC constitutes a limitation on the 
freedom of future people: we deny their access to particular versions of the good life, particular 
options which were available to past generations.   
If, for instance, the members of the Whanganui Iwi born a hundred years from now find 
themselves in a world in which their river is far too polluted to swim, void of eel weirs and dammed 
at the headwaters, their opportunity to participate in a particular way of life, one which, importantly, 
was valued by us, their ancestors, will have been irrevocably foreclosed to them. Recall one 
statement from the Whanganui River Report (1999), where Te Kuia Peeti says, 
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To my sorrow my own children and mokopuna have not grown up in this environment, but 
what we had as children is no longer there. What we thought was unchangeable and 
immutable, the river, [has] undergone changes which we never dreamt of. (80). 
 
These words demonstrate the philosophical point at hand: the latter generation’s lack of the option 
to swim in the Whanganui River is a case of intergenerational injustice.  
 In another example, consider the case of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, where a group 
petitioned to receive redress for climatic damages to their way of life:60  
The transition of their physical environment due to the individual and cumulative effects of 
climate change have undercut the Inuit’s ability to enjoy the benefits of their traditional way 
of life and property, and have imperiled Inuit health, safety, subsistence harvest, travel (Watt-
Cloutier et al. 2005). 
 
The token resources required by the Inuit people and the Whanganui Iwi are a clear case of SCNC 
non-substitutability. It is not so much that their basic sustenance has been threatened, but their 
unique and particular ways of acquiring sustenance, a localized version of the good life, has been 
denied to them—and, crucially, to future individuals. No other river or hologram substitute will do, 
for—as I will expand upon in the following section—these distinct conceptions of the good depend 
on the continuity of these natural spaces and associated practices throughout time: a virtual 
Whanganui river would not provide the same cross generational linkage.  
Crucially, from the birds-eye view of the hypothetical contractor, parties in the OP are 
immune to the worries of my SCNC Skeptic. Deliberators realize the potential for human adaptation, 
                                                 
60Heyward (2011) uses this example as well.  
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recognize that if they are born into a later generation they might be oblivious to what they’re missing, 
organized their lives around substitute natural or human capital. From their removed perspective, 
however, the manifest unfairness that is sanctioned by any theory of intergenerational justice that 
neglects reference to token natural objects is clear. Without some specification of the special, 
specific SCNC that should persist, we endorse a profoundly unfair imbalance in the set opportunities 
available between generations. 
If, then, SCNC is a necessary feature of specific formulations of the good life, then the 
directive to maintain ‘opportunities’ needs qualification: this set of options ought to include 
opportunities that are of value to us now. Barry (1989) is wrong to contend, then, that in the spirit 
of “respecting the creativity of future people,” we should “provide future generations with the 
opportunity to live good lives according to their conception of what constitutes a good life” (104). 
If all that is required is that future people are provided freedom to live the kind of lives that they 
value, the current generation is sanctioned in limiting future people’s freedoms as we pursue our 
own conceptions of the good. As we shall see below, preserving currently valuable options does not 
result in forcing a particular comprehensive conception upon future people; rather it is a principle in 
service of intergenerational neutrality.            
To summarize this insight: SCNC underpins many current versions of the good life, and thus, 
if we are concerned with preserving options for future people, we ought to be concerned with SCNC. 
While the OP prohibits the knowledge of what particular conception of the good we will eventually 
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endorse among a given set, hypothetical contractors will agree that a decline in SCNC corresponds 
with a decline in the robustness—the substantive diversity—of that set. If those in the OP are given 
the knowledge that any generation can cause irreversible damage to many aspects of the natural 
world, they will choose to be more explicit in their designation of what to save, include specific 
reference to the SCNC that, even in the OP, they know is constitutive of many conceptions of the 
good. While it is of course imperative to maintain for future people access to food, water, and air, a 
weak theory of intergenerational justice could require such conditions while concurrently denying 
to future people a specific way of securing such goods as well as specific cultural, spiritual, and 
recreation practices—thus endorsing a diminished set of options for the future.  
Our Skeptic, of course, will object that the opportunities provided by valued places can 
surely be substituted with the expansion of other options, alternate ways of life that will likely arise 
from technological advance. Why, you might wonder, is some interaction with SCNC necessary for 
adequate choice? My response to this objection—which to please the Skeptic must remain neutral 
and avoid the kinds of claims from the beginning of this chapter—is twofold: first, I would reiterate 
that the number of opportunities available not the only way of measuring the value of the set. As 
demonstrated by the basket example, there is clearly a difference between a heterogeneous 
cornucopia and a basket of apples. The second response, which should become more clear in the 
following section, falls from the temporal continuity of SCNC. What distinguishes SCNC from 
artificial nature substitutes is the way in which places have held meaning for human communities 
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over time: one can sit by the Whanganui River and imagine both predecessors and progeny having 
the same experience. The option to participate in a temporally extended project, to engage with a 
place of intergenerational value, cannot be substituted even with an exact replica or virtual reality 
experience, for such compensation will not exhibit the same long-term significance.  
 
Future Oriented Projects in the OP 
Let me next expand, then, on one feature of SCNC that further situates it as something self-
interested parties in the OP would deem a non-substitutable building block of intergenerational 
justice. As noted by Janna Thompson (2009), Avner De Shalit (2005), and Eric Brandstedt (2016),  
part of the value of our projects—whatever generation we happen to be born into—is derived from 
their status as ‘future oriented.’ That is, we often imagine ourselves as participating in activities 
which will continue to be important after our deaths, or perhaps may never even be beneficial during 
our lives. Consider, for instance, the scientist engaging in long-term cancer research, or the elderly 
novelist penning his last book. If the scientist was told that, regardless of her efforts, cancer would 
be effectively cured immediately following her death, or if the novelist was informed that his 
publisher would drop his book and his masterpiece would never once be read, part of what makes 
these projects valuable would be lost.  
Eric Brandstedt (2016) details a convincing version of this claim, positing that we ought to 
augment the list of Rawlsian primary goods with an additional good: “the sustainability of values.”  
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Brandstedt suggests that a group of people treat one another unfairly by choosing not to care about 
other’s long-term projects, “as doing so jeopardizes the preferences, commitments, projects and 
traditions whose value and meaningfulness are conditioned on a future continuation and 
maintenance of society” (282). This means that, as we come down upon principles of justice, one 
primary good is that the conditions for one’s projects being valuable will always obtain.  
 Importantly, Brandstedt is careful to state that sustainability of values as a primary good is 
compatible with liberal neutrality, for it “summarizes reasons to preserve values underlying various 
practices and projects, but these are not necessarily reasons to preserve any particular culture or 
tradition that may instantiate them. Because of that the resultant theory cannot be said to be 
improperly conservative” (282). Brandstedt’s argument, then, has the potential to provide neutral 
justification designating SCNC as non-substitutable. If Brandstedt is correct, we are obligated to 
preserve the conditions upon which the value of one’s projects depends. If, then, we can secure that 
engagement with SCNC is the type of project in which the future-existence of such resources is 
necessary for the value of the project itself, than the preservation of SCNC is implicated in our 
theory of intergenerational justice. 
Indeed, it does seem as if SCNC is the type of thing whose value in part depends on its 
persistence into the future. Returning to my central example, it is reasonable that part of the value 
of the Whanganui River comes from envisioning that it will persist: if such future-existence is not 
secured, the value of the river to current individuals is undermined. Part of the importance of these 
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spaces comes from their ability to connect generations; the meaning of natural spaces is linked to 
our ability to imagine our progeny enjoying it. Conceptions of the good that involve SCNC depend 
on it being the kind of thing that has been part of the good life of past people and will continue to 
be so for future people.  
If SCNC is not specified as something that ought to exist, if it is not treated as non-
substitutable with regard to future generations, we disrupt the ability of current people to value and 
engage with the river in the same way. Recall, for instance, the Whanganui Iwi member imagining 
his children enjoying the same experience of swimming in unpolluted waters. The parties in the OP 
thus have a further self-interested reason for mandating that SCNC be protected intergenerationally: 
there is a good chance that the persistence of such places will be of vital importance, give meaning 
to many projects that transcend the bounds of one lifetime. In other words, the fact that places of 
value will exist in the future is a condition upon their current value. In this way, we can respond to 
the Skeptic who considers the options presented by technological advances to be fair substitutions 
with the options presented by SCNC: non-existent technology does not provide the opportunity to 
participate in a temporally extended project.  
It should be noted that this approach, while still offering justification for the mandatory place 
of SCNC in a just bequest, diverges from the methodology employed in the rest of this thesis. The 
obligation to preserve the value of future oriented projects—by ensuring that such projects do, 
indeed, continue into the future—is, as formulated by Brandstedt, a duty we owe to each other; it 
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need not rely on the stipulation that what we pick in the OP needs to be binding across all 
generations. Instead, the “sustainability of values” argument justifies the non-substitutability of 
SCNC within the framework of justice between contemporaries.61  
However, it does seem that deliberators in the OP, constrained by the intergenerational 
condition, might also posit SCNC as something we owe, not just to our contemporaries, but to future 
people. If they agree, which seems likely, that SCNC is indeed an example of a ‘future oriented 
project,’ an object whose value depends on being able to project its existence into the future and 
imagine its existence in the past, then it looks like, once again, self-interested parties would opt to 
include it as both an intra and intergenerational obligation. No matter where one falls on time’s 
arrow, they can be sure that part of the value of the projects which exist when they arrive will depend 
on the persistence of particular objects into the future, and the meaning placed on such projects in 
the past. This, in some senses, is a reiteration of the maxim to preserve options: without specifying 
and maintaining these temporally extended objects, we deny to future people the opportunity to 
participate in a distinct conception of the good that requires the presence of places with deep 
historical value. The long-term historical significance of SCNC makes it an option that is unique in 
kind, for the opportunities provided by technological progress cannot substitute for the option of 
engaging with places that have been of perennial intergenerational significance. 
                                                 
61If you, like many critics, consider Rawls’ intergenerational condition to be ad hoc Mazor (2010), designed simply to 
‘solve’ the intergenerational savings problem but not independently justifiable, this approach secures SCNC as a non-





 Intergenerational Neutrality  
Finally, I must respond to the Skeptic’s worry that the injunction to save SCNC imports a 
non-neutral conception of the good. My approach, you might say, forces a set of options upon future 
people that limits our potential to explore new options, or proceed with current ones of the kind that 
require environmental damage. We don’t complain, for instance, that the option of participating in 
the good life of being a cowboy in the Western US no longer exists, for this option has been, for all 
intents and purposes, forgone in favor of infrastructure and technological advances, exciting new 
opportunities and capabilities. This worry, however, fails to note the difference between human and 
natural capital, and the way the latter, especially SCNC, can be irreversibly damaged on long-term 
timescales. In responding to this complaint, a commitment to neutrality comes to light as a third, 
final reason, available to our hypothetical contractors, that SCNC is a non-substitutable component 
of what we leave posterity.  
Let me explain: Including SCNC as one essential element of intergenerational justice, upon 
reflection, actually promotes intergenerational neutrality, a central commitment of Rawls’ 
characterization of justice. Or, perhaps more aptly, it inoculates against intergenerational non-
neutrality. If once the VIO is dropped our denizens decide they would indeed rather return to the 
lifestyle of the American West, that horses and shoot em ups are a fundamental part what a good 
life consists of, this change could be enacted over the course of a lifetime. So long as the natural 
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capital remained—open prairies and grasslands—we could make this option possible by tearing 
down a few gas stations. In contrast, even if we could rally the political will to clean the Whanganui 
River to a swimmable standard, a recent New Zealand report suggests that this change would take 
over 50 years to occur, if it is possible at all (Office of the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Advisor 
2017).  
Thus, while some might object that including SCNC within the bounds of intergenerational 
justice privileges a certain comprehensive conception which embraces the environmentalist’s 
premise, in fact, it does the opposite. This is highlighted by Dobson (2003):  
Strong sustainability is, in other words, a way to maximise neutrality in respect of 
‘comprehensive doctrines’. The belief in total substitutability found in weak sustainability 
amounts to a foreclosing of opportunities: you can have any kind of good life you like as 
long as it is wholly and completely expressible in terms of ‘gunk’ (or whatever it is into 
which everything has been converted)(158). 
 
By explicitly choosing, in some respect, the SCNC that persists, we act in accordance with a 
commitment to liberal autonomy and neutrality.62 The friends of Solow and the Skeptic might 
continue to complain it is paternalistic to mandate that world of a certain natural character persists, 
that a neutral theory of intergenerational justice will avoid forcing current values onto future people, 
whose preferences are “none of our business” (Solow 1991, 182).  The alternative, though, not 
                                                 
62 Since the focus of this thesis is justice between generations, I do not comment on how an anti-paternalistic 
requirement to leave options open for future generations might be in tension with democratic decision-making and 
present-day paternalism. See Ellis (2016) for discussion.  
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picking what persists, threatens to leave for future people only those options for living the good life 
that are available after we live ours.  
Put another way, regardless of whether we endorse substitutability or not, something 
physical world will persevere. Whether we include SCNC among our intergenerational obligations 
or not, we are making a normative choice regarding the world future people inherit: declining to 
posit SCNC as non-substitutable is a non-neutral decision of its own.  If we are concerned with 
picking a currency of intergenerational justice that is universally acceptable—and I think we 
should be—the question becomes which option—substitutability or non-substitutability—services 
this goal. While both positions nudge future people towards valuing specific versions of the good 
life, adopting SCNC as one important feature of the metric of justice is, due to the irreversibility of 
environmental policy decisions, an intergenerational principle more neutral than the alternative. 
Once again, irreversibility is crucial, for, as noted, while SCNC is not the kind of 
universally valuable primary good that can be distributed between contemporaries, it can be 
distributed between generations: our permanent destruction of valued spaces might result in a 
manifestly unfair intergenerational allocation.  Since, in the words of Ellis (2016) “each win for 
the development side is permanent, while each win for the conservation side is temporary” (507), 
we find that sanctioning substitutability results in one long-term environmental outlook: 
irreversible change.  
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The permanence of environmentally damaging policies precludes future people from 
valuing the natural capital that will be destroyed, illegitimately prohibiting certain versions of the 
good life.  Even Dworkin (1985), who in most of his works argues that conservation falls outside 
the limits of justice, is sympathetic: suppose, he says, that a liberal, in the face of what he also 
deems “irreversible” environmental destruction, fears that a certain way of life “will become 
unknown, so that the process is not neutral amongst competing ideas of the good life, but in fact 
destructive of the very possibility of some of these.” If this is the case, he says, the liberal has 
“reasons for a program of conservation that are not only consistent with his constitutive morality, 
but sponsored by it” (202). Licensing that SCNC is intergenerationally substitutable, then, 
endorses an irreversible decline in these spaces that is decidedly non-neutral among competing 
competitions of the good. In contrast, a commitment to non-substitutability does not permanently 







In closing, let’s survey the structure and central claims of this thesis before noting the relevance of 
my argument for our approach to environmental management as well as areas for future work.  First, 
in an extended introduction, I put forth a premise in narrative form: there are some places which are 
non-substitutable components of current conceptions of the good life. The Whanganui River in the 
North Island of New Zealand features as a central example of what I call Sociocultural Natural 
Capital—places that are valuable over and above their capacity to provide for basic human 
sustenance. While the non-fungibility of the Whanganui River to contemporary communities is 
unequivocal, the focus of this thesis is the significance of such places for futurity. My central 
question then, was this: is SCNC a non-substitutable component of intergenerational justice?  
 In Chapter I, I gave an introduction to intergenerational justice, noting three primary 
questions that any theory of future oriented obligations must answer. I subsequently focused in on 
the ‘metric question,’ which seeks to outline the evaluative currency of justice between generations. 
To understand what might be a feature of a fair bequest, I unpacked the concept of ‘substitutability,’ 
a term primarily utilized in the sustainability literature to mark the persistence of a specific physical 
feature of the world as obligatory.  Scholarship on sustainability, while making increasing attempts 
to integrate sociocultural value into designations of Critical Natural Capital—those physical features 
of the world that must be preserved for sustainability to obtain—does not adequately recognize the 
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crucial distinction between the kind of substitutability exhibited by SCNC and that shown by natural 
capital necessary to preserve basic human sustenance—BCNC. If sustainability—and thus 
intergenerational justice—requires determining what exactly (if anything), is a non-substitutable 
ingredient in the selection of places we leave for the future, we need to consider both kinds of non-
substitutability. Unfortunately, while it seems prima facie true that we ought to leave future 
generations with enough to fulfill basic needs, including SCNC as a mandatory component of what 
we leave succeeding generations encounters greater justificatory obstacles.    
 In Chapter II, then, I note a significant set of objections regarding the place of SCNC within 
intergenerational justice. First, one might be skeptical regarding the general possibility of standing 
in relations of justice with future people due to their non-existence and non-identity. I respond to 
these worries, clearing the way for my more specific claims. Second, the Skeptic may have doubts 
that SCNC is a non-substitutable component of a just bequest; the kind of substitutability SCNC 
exhibits complicates an assertion of its essential role. The ‘SCNC Skeptic’ has a number of salient 
concerns: she will contend that the preservation of SCNC is paternalistic given our uncertainty 
regarding future people’s preferences, note that we don’t blame our predecessors for the same 
environmental modification I condemn, and highlight the remarkable human ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances. I do not respond in depth to these concerns; rather, the remainder of my 
thesis serves as my reply.  
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 In Chapter III, I hunt for a response to the Skeptic among existing theories of 
intergenerational justice: is SCNC implicated in contemporary accounts of what we owe the future? 
I conclude that it is not, although I note that capabilitarianism provides a promising start. Perhaps I 
come up empty handed, though, because current answers to the metric question are extensionist, 
grafting accepted currencies of justice between contemporaries on to intergenerational concerns. I 
subsequently outline features of our relationship with future people that demand reexamining this 
methodology. In the absence of an existing justification for SCNC, an independent response to the 
Skeptic is required—or else I must acquiesce that the commonly-held intuition that SCNC ought to 
persist might be false.  
Thus, in my final chapter, employing the Rawlsian mechanism of the original position in an 
attempt to arrive at a neutral conception of what we ought to save, I present a defense of the claim 
that a full-bodied account of intergenerational justice includes reference to the spaces and places 
that are of non-substitutable value to current communities. After rejecting three potential arguments 
for natural preservation which cannot adequately respond to the Skeptic, I make an alternate 
argument. Acting justly towards future people requires preserving for them not only the freedoms 
afforded by intergenerationally just institutions, but a diverse list of options that includes—to the 
extent possible—that SCNC that is a necessary feature of many present-day lives. I put forth three 
related reasons to support this claim, which are agreeable regardless of your individual relationship 
to nature or conception of the good. First, the persistence of SCNC undergirds the provision of a 
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robust set of choices from which future people can choose. Second and relatedly, options involving 
SCNC—and not some artificial substitute—represent a unique, non-substitutable kind of option due 
to their long-term historical significance. Third, placing SCNC as a essential feature of 
intergenerational justice is, despite worries of intergenerational paternalism, in service of a neutral 
formulation of what we owe progeny.  
In summary, then, this thesis has argued that even with boundless technological knowledge 
capable of replacing even the most complicated ecological services, there remains a section of 
CNC—SCNC—that is still a non-substitutable feature of what we owe the future. While it is a 
present-day injustice to deny individuals access to such goods, a Skeptic might consider their 
intergenerational preservation merely supererogatory, noting that future people may not share our 
regard for such places or—if we destroy or degrade them—find a new source of recreational, 
spiritual, and cultural value. In contrast, I argued that a lack of attention to SCNC is, in fact, a crucial 
error: value-laden natural spaces ought to be considered within the evaluative space of 
intergenerational justice. What we owe future people is not merely the freedom to formulate their 
good life from a set of whatever options we choose to leave for them. Instead, some consideration 
must be given to the content of those options: a just set will include versions of the good life as we 
conceive it now. To be truly intergenerationally fair, we are obligated to preserve more than BCNC. 
Instead, “future people should be able to share (at least certain aspects of) the particular way of life 
of currently living people” (Meyer 2016). Specifying and maintaining SCNC we’ve deemed non-
139 
 
substitutable is one aspect of such a duty, to be visibly included within the bounds of 
intergenerational justice. 
 
Future Directions and Climate Change  
  A full-bodied description of intergenerational justice, then, ought not implicitly endorse a 
world full of satisfied, rich, and capable humans who are, whether they are aware of it or not, victims 
of our choices. Instead, it should speak to what ought to exist. My thesis, then is an injunction for 
localized intergenerational justice: the existence of global environmental problems does not render 
local duties—the preservation of token places of value—outside the bounds of justice (Francis 
2003). 
I do not, however, engage in the project of determining which spaces. Clearly, we cannot 
secure that all SCNC persists, and we will be forced to make choices as to which spaces we consider 
most important. I have not spoken to how this process would best unfold, and how we ought to 
mitigate competing claims if, for instance, we must arbitrate between two spaces of SCNC or 
between SCNC and BCNC. I have not endorsed any hierarchical ranking of these kinds of CNC, 
nor suggested how we might translate such non-substitutable value into economic terms. I have 
conducted my analysis primarily within ideal theory: eschewing practical considerations, what, 
exactly, would a full-bodied account of intergenerational justice demand we preserve? Actualizing 
the resulting principles in our current political moment is an additional task.  
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What I hope to re-emphasize, however, is that whether we explicitly specify what ought to 
exist in the future—by, for instance, visibly including SCNC as a demand of intergenerational 
justice—places and spaces will exist regardless. Disregarding SCNC is a normative position: the 
things that ought to exist are defined by currently existing interests alone—interests which are often 
short-termist, myopically self-interested, or influenced by politicians and corporations.  
While there is a considerable literature on the obligation to preserve BCNC, an injunction to 
include SCNC as an axiological goal of intergenerational justice has not been systematically 
explored or defended. This oversight might be due to the exigency of global climate change, a 
driving force motivating increased interest in intergenerational justice. However, despite the 
cataclysmic conditions of anthropogenic warming, the question of persistence—that is, what should 
be sustained still looms large; catastrophic prospects of climate change should not, I believe, mean 
that we ignore local and place-specific environmental questions of the kind that are not directly 
related to basic human sustenance (Francis 2003). What worldly ‘stuff’ we save is still an important 
question: for the first time in human history we have the distinct power to destroy, beyond reasonable 
repair, features of the world. While these questions may feel humble in comparison to the global 
challenges of climate change, our environmental impacts can be injustice regardless, and if we 
cannot answer the kinds of environmental questions that would exist even if climate change didn’t, 
we will certainly be unable to weather the ‘moral storm’ of climate change (Gardiner 2011). 
141 
 
In fact, to conclude this thesis, I’d like to suggest that the apocalyptic narrative of climate 
change makes the project of defining what tangible, physical features of the world ought to persist 
an essential exercise. In an era where ‘cli-fi’ has become a dominant literary genre, and where doom-
filled science fiction narratives about what the future world will look like are ubiquitous,63 we often 
forget that a future world will exist—and that we are uniquely positioned to shape it.  While it will 
be tragically different than ours in many regards, requiring adaptation that will necessarily damage 
and destroy places of value to us now, it vital to remember the human-ness of future humans, 
envision then using and enjoying what we decide to leave for them. Acting justly towards the future 
alleviates the uncertainty and ambiguity of climate change, calls us to pick and preserve those places 
and spaces that are valuable in our contemporary moment, determining, with active effort, the very 
features of the world that persist.  
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